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INTRODUCTION
The legal treatment of compilations, including electronic
collections of factual information, presents problems for copyright
law. The tests employed in determining subsistence of copyright,
whether framed as a creativity-based standard, arising from the
investment of “labor, skill or judgment” in either collection or
presentation of contents, or some combination thereof, are
notoriously difficult to apply. There is also risk of independent
proprietary protection inadvertently extending to the contents of
such compilations that are given copyright protection.
Notwithstanding the complex nature of the problems, and a
dispiriting lack of momentum towards harmonized legal treatment
of databases at the international level,1 the protection of databases
is very much on the agenda in the revision of the Canadian
Copyright Act2 and difficult decisions will soon have to be made.
There are three main problems that lawmakers face when
revising present protections. First, although the public policy
justification for protection is an intrinsically economic one, there is
little in the way of empirical economic analysis to aid in
considering the effect of existing or revised legal models on new
1

Notwithstanding the adoption of the status quo in article 5 of the World Intellectual
Property Organization [WIPO] Copyright Treaty [WCT], the protection of databases is
still a matter being discussed by the WIPO Standing Committee on Copyright and
Related Rights [SCCR] and was last discussed at the 7th session in May, 2002. See
Report: Seventh Session, Geneva, May 13 to 17, 2002, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/10 (May 31,
2002), available at http://www.wipo.org/news/en/index.html?wipo_content_frame=/
news/en/documents.html. The proposal still at the heart of the discussions is the Basic
Proposal for the Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect
to Databases, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/6 (1996). One study submitted during the 7th
session considering the economic implications of database protection primarily in
developing countries encouraged protection from an economic perspective, but was
largely narrative and offered no new empirical analysis. See Yale M. Braunstein,
Economic Impact of Database Protection in Developing Countries and Countries in
Transition, WIPO Doc. SCCR/7/2 (Apr. 4, 2002), available at http://www.wipo.org/
news/en/index.html?wipo_content_frame=/news/en/documents.html. Database protection
remains on the SCCR agenda for continuing consideration.
2
The protection of databases is expressly within the Canadian government’s plans for
copyright reform. See A Framework for Copyright Reform, at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/
SSG/rp01101e.html.
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and emerging industries. Determining the level and scope of
optimal protection through the dominant economic incentive
paradigm becomes a very uncertain business. Second, the
implications of maintaining proprietary interests in such
collections may yield unwanted secondary effects and result in
over-containment of data, with negative implications for access to
data and markets alike. Recent studies indicate that this effect is of
particular concern regarding data used in scientific research.
Third, while sui generis rights in such subject matter may avoid the
imperfections of an overly robust proprietary approach, such a
model may require a greater explicit acceptance of unfair
competition doctrine than has previously been the case.
As a threshold matter, databases are subject matter worthy of
protection and, further, revision of the status quo is desirable. The
present regime makes available an uncertain degree of protection
through copyright law. It features high administrative and
transaction costs in non-optimized security expenditures in the
form of technological mechanisms and legal costs, risks overcontainment through overly restrictive contractual arrangements
that must be litigated elsewhere where dominant market positions
are abused, and allows for obscured judicial policymaking in
determining questions of subsistence of copyright. A revised
regime should aim to take better account of the economic
implications of protection, but avoid any temptation to import
economic considerations directly into legal models (obviating the
need to turn judges into economists for the purposes of doctrinal
development); be more transparent in its construction and
development of policy; allow for socially desirable access that is
not market-driven; be constructed with a view to international
harmonization; and be sensitive to Canadian legal traditions. This
author is aware that it may seem somewhat awkward to advocate a
nationalist agenda within a paper that considers the utility of
comparative sources and experience, but Canadian policymakers
should take care not to allow the questions for decision to be
framed in terms of the policy preferences that dominate elsewhere,
particularly in respect to American conceptions of fair use rights.
It is suggested that Canadian lawmakers should have close
regard for the recent European experience in the protection of both
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original and unoriginal databases under the EU Database Directive,
3
which makes available both a copyright in databases and a nonproprietary sui generis “database right.” Though developed in
Europe in a somewhat haphazard way, and implemented
problematically, the idea of a two-tiered system seems an attractive
one. Such an approach has the capacity to differentiate between
compilations that are truly the result of a principled view of
authorship and worthy of full copyright and accompanying moral
rights, and compilations that are less worthy but still protectable
based on the sufficiency of the investment of labor and resources
expended in their creation (much as is done in present
circumstances through pragmatic constructions of originality in
determining subsistence of copyright). Provided that these sui
generis rights are carefully balanced with appropriate public
interest permissions and defenses (and perhaps subject to
mandatory licensing provisions in respect to single-source data as
well), this article suggests that a suitable two-tiered regime could
be a desirable way both to better protect databases in Canada, and,
perhaps of equal utility, to reawaken presently dormant
negotiations towards internationally harmonized treatment through
a Database Treaty administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO) on the same basis.
I. OF PROTECTION AND ACCESS: DESCRIBING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST JUSTIFYING PROTECTION OF DATABASES
It is as mother’s milk for intellectual property lawyers to accept
that perpetual intellectual property protection does not yield new
stores of intellectual property perpetually any more than does more
intellectual property law result in more intellectual property
(though it probably does ensure more intellectual property
lawyers). Protections must be balanced against other important
interests not all of which are economic in character,
notwithstanding that the dominant reason for protection may be an
economic one. This section briefly sets out the nature of the public
policy interests that justify protection of databases.
3

Council Directive 96/9/EC, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20.
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The subject matter at issue here is sometimes referred to using
the various terms of art that dominate in a given intellectual
property law system (e.g., compilations, tables, or catalogues), but
should be treated generically when considering the public interest
in legal protection. For the purposes of this discussion, it may be
easiest to refer to the generalized definition of databases as set out
in the EU Database Directive: “collections of independent works,
data or other materials which are systematically or methodically
arranged and can be individually accessed.”4 Databases, then,
need not be digitized works in electronic form, the modern
association, but may include traditional paper-based collections of
information. Though creative collections like anthologies of
poetry would fit within this discussion as much as a collection of
telephone numbers, the market is more interested in the latter.
Through the use of innovative information technology, it is now
possible to gather together, in one comprehensive work, a
collection of data verified as accurate on a given subject. Business
people recognize the commercial utility of such information
resources, and estimates put the global database industry at tens of
billions of dollars per year.5 These collections of facts may be
expensive to create, expensive to verify as accurate, expensive to
maintain as comprehensive, and, not surprisingly, expensive to
gain access to by consumers. Quite obviously, then, there is a
strong national interest in encouraging the creation of new wealth
in the form of such intellectual property, as well as facilitating its
trade and accessibility to foster commercial interests within
modern information-oriented economies. The utility of databases
is thus an economic one, although these economic interests have to
be balanced against the greater public interest in fostering specific
uses that are socially significant—in other words, the basic

4

Id. para. 17. Whether this is a desirable definition for the purposes of defining
doctrine is another matter.
5
See Statutory Protection for Databases: Economic & Public Policy Issues: Hearing
on H.R. 2652 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Laura D. Tyson & Edward F.
Sherry, Members, Info. Indus. Ass’n), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
41118.htm.
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economic paradigm underlying much of intellectual property law
generally.6
A. The Dominant Consideration: Economics of Databases
With apologies to the well versed, and proceeding from the
proposition that the public interest in this sort of utilitarian subject
matter is intrinsically but not exclusively an economic one, it is
helpful to begin by restating in broad terms the classical economic
incentive paradigm. Intellectual property, or “information goods”
as the economic literature would prefer, is generally more valuable
when in the hands of consumers than producers. Thus, the goal of
policymakers is to construct and maintain a system that enables
such goods to be traded successfully in the market. Trading these
goods allows producers to recoup investment, and competition
between rivals leads to an optimally efficient market.7 In such an
optimal market, supply and demand reach an equilibrium price
which alone drives production such that an optimal number of
information goods are created using an optimal amount of the
finite resources that may be made available for such purposes.8 In
such optimal conditions, the market is self-regulating and there is
no need for regulatory intervention.9
The difficulty faced by those dealing with information goods is
primarily attributable to their intangible nature.10 The distribution
and consumption of such goods does not diminish their availability
and does not result in scarcity; they are “non-excludable” (once the
good is produced, producers cannot exclude others from being
benefited by it) with “non-rival” (there is no cost incurred in
producing an additional good).11 This public goods character of
6

See generally Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources
for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY (1962), reprinted in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Peter Drahos ed., 1999) (presenting a classic formulation).
7
See id. at 6–10.
8
See id.
9
See id.
10
See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, in PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC
AFFAIRS (1989), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL &
INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 17, 19 (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997).
11
See id. at 19–20. Thomas Jefferson’s analogy to lighting one candle from the flame
of another is widely referred to in the literature: “Its peculiar character, too, is that no one
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intellectual property results in a situation where the fixed cost of
independent creation tends to be very high, but the cost of
reproduction and distribution tends to be very low—thus providing
a strong incentive for rivals to “free ride” on the producer’s
investment of resources rather than invest independent resources to
create these same goods or pay license fees.12 Where the good is
appropriated without payment by such a free rider and a copy is
made available for sale, the original producer of the good faces
competition in which the rival’s sale price reflects only the
marginal costs of reproduction.13 If the producer must lower her
price to compete with the free rider, the producer will not be able
to recoup the investment in production.14 If the producer doesn’t
lower her price, she recoups none of the investment and any
incentive to produce evaporates.15 This causes market failure.
Thus, the allowance of free riding is highly undesirable as it
disturbs the self-regulating market preventing optimal efficiency
from being achieved.
The ease by which information goods can be appropriated by a
rival gives rise to two welfare losses: underproduction (through
lack of sufficient market pressure) and underutilization (where the
price charged is not sufficiently attractive to consumers).16 These
effects can be addressed through regulation, either in the form of
direct or indirect subsidy17 (thus lowering the producer’s fixed
costs and transferring the cost of free-riding to consumers as a

possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an
idea from me, receives instructions himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his
taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.” Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), reprinted in 13 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 333–
34 (Thomas Jefferson Mem’l Ass’n ed., 1905), cited in SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN,
COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 24 (2001).
12
See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
292 (1996).
13
See id.
14
See id.
15
See id. at 293–94.
16
See id. at 293.
17
Some economists advocate subsidy systems. See, e.g., Steven Shavell & Tanguy Van
Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
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whole) or through the legal enforcement of a temporary monopoly
in the form of property rights.18
Monopolies (created through property rights) give the producer
the power to charge a supra-market price and to slow the
dissemination of these goods in the market.19 The strength of the
right is important as the fixed costs of potential entrants into the
market are affected, the more the potential rival can “borrow” from
the producer without payment, the lower the costs of production, as
licensing costs, independent research, and other transaction costs
are saved.20 The danger, then, is that “while trying to diminish the
social welfare loss due to underproduction, the welfare loss due to
underutilization is increased.”21 The content and features of the
created right then become crucial. The duration of the right (its
length), the subject matter that it encompasses (the depth of the
copyright), and the nature of what acts are considered infringing
(the breadth of the right) are all significant. In determining the
content of the right and its overall strength, there is a need to
balance the desire to maintain an adequate incentive to create
information goods (favoring a high degree of protection) and the
full availability of such goods to those in the market that are
willing to pay at least the costs of production (favoring a low
degree of protection).22 According to Posner and Landes, the most
important implications of this welfare model in relation to
copyright works are that the optimal amount of protection is higher
for classes of subject matter that are more valuable socially, and
that increasing copyright above the optimal level leads to the

18

See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293.
See id. This description is admittedly crudely drawn. This Article does not include,
for example, consideration of price discrimination to mitigate against the negative effects
of deadweight loss. These issues are covered admirably elsewhere. See, e.g., Jonathan
Putnam, Copyright and the New Economy, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION
IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Jonathan Putnam ed., forthcoming 2002); Wendy
J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998).
20
See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293.
21
Constanze Thönebe, The Legal Protection of Databases in Europe—An Economic
Analysis 14 (2000) (unpublished dissertation, Université Aix-Marseille III).
22
See Netanel, supra note 12, at 293.
19
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production of more works but with lower welfare per work.23
This, then, presents the fundamental dilemma for policymakers in
structuring legal rules to achieve more efficient market conditions:
without a legal monopoly, too little information will be produced;
but with a legal monopoly, too little information will be used.24
Databases, in contrast, rely primarily on their
comprehensiveness and accuracy to make them attractive in the
market.25 The costs of production generally fall to gathering,
maintaining, and verifying information, as well as presenting it in a
suitable format with appropriate user-friendly tools. One would be
less willing to use a database without some degree of confidence
that the contents are accurate as of the date of use, regardless of
product qualities such as an electronic search facility’s ease of use.
Thus, the degree to which databases are updated and their contents
verified as accurate is vital.26 Indeed, this is an important issue
that the economic model must grapple with: Can legal protection
provide an adequate incentive for producers to update their works,
while tailoring the right to avoid updating that is not socially
useful? Crucial in the incentive structure is the term of the right
and the conditions that must be satisfied in order to continue or
reacquire the right.
B. Balancing Protection of Databases: The Public Interest in
Access to Data
No matter how one frames the issue,27 ultimately the public
interest is in balancing protection with those uses that are so
23
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 343–44 (1989).
24
See id.
25
Christian Koboldt, The EU Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases and the
Incentives to Update: An Economic Analysis, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 131 (1997).
26
See id. at 131.
27
One may frame the issue in terms of the “idea-expression dichotomy,” but, as the
English courts note, it all depends on what you mean by an “idea” and it may be best to
avoid these types of aphorisms altogether, see L.B. (Plastics) Ltd. v. Swish Prods. Ltd.,
1979 R.P.C. 551, 629 (H.L.); or what is a “work,” see Ibcos Computers Ltd. v. Barclays
Mercantile Highland Fin. Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275 (Ch.); or a concern for the public domain,
see David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1981); LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A
WIRED WORLD (2001); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
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socially significant that the law must permit them over the
presumptive objections of the rights-holder. Although it may be
desirable to encourage investment in databases because they
represent new sources of wealth and new resources for wealthcreation, it is equally desirable that both the underlying data as
well as the database itself remain accessible; otherwise, the rightsgrant may not be sufficiently favorable to justify its recognition.
Professor Paul David takes the position that the present
international regime of ever-strengthening copyright protection,
and specifically the copyright protection of databases, threatens to
retard progress.28 Moreover, he argues, increased rights in
information technology present a range of access issues that have
largely been smothered in the public consciousness by the more
emotive issue of intellectual property rights in genetic material.29
Of crucial importance to David are threats to scientific research
and the institutional infrastructure of “open collaboration” in such
research.30 These concerns have been addressed elsewhere,
including extensive literature by Maurer31 and others32 that has led
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354
(1999); Robert C. Denicola, Freedom to Copy, 108 YALE L.J. 1661 (1999); Jessica
Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); or through slogans like
“information wants to be free,” see STEWART BRAND, THE MEDIA LAB: INVENTING THE
FUTURE AT MIT 202 (1987); or based on the position that the digital context makes legal
protections redundant and attempts to enforce legal regimes that are wasteful and wrong
when we should be creating new systems, see John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas:
Selling Wine Without Bottles on the Global Net, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL,
LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS (Adam D. Moore ed., 1997), available at
http://www.eff.org/~barlow/EconomyOfIdeas.html.
28
See Paul A. David, A Tragedy of the Public Knowledge ‘Commons’? Global Science,
Intellectual Property and the Digital Technology Boomerang (2000), at
http://www.oiprc.ox.ac.uk/EJWP0400.pdf (last modified Sept. 10, 2000).
29
See id.
30
See id.
31
See Stephen M. Maurer, Raw Knowledge: Protecting Technical Databases for
Science & Industry, in COMM. FOR A STUDY ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST COMM’N ON PHYSICAL SCIENCES,
MATHEMATICS, AND APPLICATIONS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
WORKSHOP ON PROMOTING ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL DATA FOR THE PUBLIC
INTEREST: AN ASSESSMENT OF POLICY OPTIONS app. C at 337–76 (1999).
32
See Stephen M. Maurer & Suzanne Scotchmer, Database Protection: Is it Broken
and Should We Fix It?, 284 SCI. 1129 (1999); Stephen M. Maurer et al., Europe’s
Database Experiment, 294 SCI. 789 (2001) [hereinafter Maurer et al., Europe’s Database
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to criticism of extended database protection in Canada on this and
other bases.33 While acknowledging the appropriation problem
tending to market failure, David criticizes an over-dependency on
proprietary protections:
The problem is not so much intellectual property rights
mechanism itself, which although imperfect, has been
found to work well enough when it comes to stimulating
private investment in the exploitation of commercial
opportunities based upon existing bodies of scientific and
engineering knowledge. What is more problematic for the
long run, however, is that an unchecked bias towards
expanding of the domain of information goods within
which private property institutions and market mechanisms
flourish, is steadily encroaching upon the domain of public
information. In doing so, it has tended to weaken, and may
in the end seriously undermine those non-market
institutions which historically have proved themselves to be
especially effective in sustaining rapid growth in the
scientific and technological knowledge base that is
available to be exploited.34
David goes on to argue that the availability of a communications
infrastructure that allows for the sharing and efficient searching of
relevant information will go unexploited, with negative effects for
both the organization and funding of research projects in the future
(especially since government subsidies to scientists have been
reduced in recent years).35 All of this leads to the “digital
dilemma,” the resolution of which has, thus far, favored producers
at the expense of the public domain:
As a consequence of the construction of novel and
potentially legal rights in intellectual property, and the
encouragement of public and quasi-public institutions in
Experiment]; Stephen M. Maurer et al., Science’s Neglected Legacy, 405 NATURE 117
(2000) [hereinafter Maurer et al., Science’s Neglected Legacy].
33
See Suzanne A. Scotchmer & Stephen M. Maurer, Across Two Worlds: Database
Protection in the US and Europe, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION IN THE
KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY (Jonathan Putnam ed., forthcoming 2002).
34
David, supra note 28, at 3.
35
See id. at 5, 16.
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making use of these to attract private sector funding as a
way of meeting the high first-costs of making digitized
archives available on electronic networks, larger and larger
portions of the public data “commons” are being
“enclosed” and transformed into private monopolies.36
David is not alone in raising these concerns. The question of
the impact of database protection on scientific research was one of
the matters that was the subject of inquiries by WIPO during the
failed attempt to create a Database Treaty, and a range of
respondents indicated their concern that the need to ensure the free
circulation of data in the interest of scientific research be
maintained in any protection system.37 The United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
observed:
Databases financed with public funds, whose purpose is the
efficient accomplishment of public-interest missions (at
both the national and the international level), cover a
variety of very extensive fields. UNESCO and the World
Meteorological Organization (WMM), for instance,
produce this kind of database in connection with subjects
like earth sciences, the environment, ecology, water,
oceanography or space . . . . The rules that will govern
exchanges involving this type of database and databases
produced for commercial purposes should not, therefore, be
derived from the logic of competitive exploitation which is
a feature of commerce. For the scientific community, the
public-interest mission underlying the raison d’être of
databases produced by public institutions is sufficient in
itself to make people acknowledge that their producers
should be allowed free and full access, on a nondiscriminatory basis, to all sources of data (in whatever

36

Id. at 7.
See Int’l Bureau, WIPO, Information Meeting on Intellectual Property in Databases,
WIPO Doc. DB/IM/4 (Sept. 4, 1997) (including an analytic table of questions raised upon
which consultation was sought), available at http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings
/infdat97/pdf/db_im_4.pdf; Report, WIPO Doc. DB/IM/6 (Sept. 19, 1997), available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings/infdat97/pdf/db_im_6.pdf.
37

2-FREEDMAN FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 1:03 PM

SHOULD CANADA ENACT A NEW DATABASE RIGHT?

47

form) that might be useful for updating the databases and
improving their performance.38
The resolution of this issue is a difficult one once proprietary
entitlements enter the picture. Some argue that the best solution is
extra-legal in the sense of voluntary agreements to enforce rights
only against certain uses or users. Thus, Reichman and Uhlir have
recently presented a working paper with the outlines of a top-down
voluntary system (“a dynamic e-commons”), similar to Stallman’s
GNU open-source license scheme,39 which would essentially form
a public interest cooperative of scientific researchers who are also
rights-holders.40 This association of public-spirited scientists
would license to industry but give free access to data for pure
research purposes, all secured by contract.41 It would be
administered by funding agencies, universities, and research bodies
and would, it is suggested, benefit industry by providing more
opportunities for commercialization of research.42 The underlying
premise is to encourage pure science while recognizing the large
financial support received by the scientific community, directly or
indirectly, through public funds leading to commercial restrictions
on developed data.43 It relies to an extent, as the authors
acknowledge, on the formal inability of the American government
to control public information through proprietary copyright
protection, which places such information into the unprotectable
public domain.44 The same is not true in Europe, Canada, or in the
38

UNESCO, Observations, WIPO Doc. DB/IM/5 (Sept. 15, 1997), available at
http://www.wipo.org/eng/meetings/infdat97/pdf/db_im_5.pdf. See also NATIONAL
RESEARCH COUNCIL, BITS OF POWER: ISSUES IN GLOBAL ACCESS TO SCIENTIFIC DATA
(1997); Severine Dusollier et al., Copyright and Access to Information in the Digital
Environment, 34 COPYRIGHT BULL. 4 (2000).
39
See David McGowan, The Legal Implications of Open Source Software, 2001 U.
ILL. L. REV. 241; Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, at
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/shouldbefree.html.
40
See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Promoting Public Good Uses of Scientific Data:
A Contractually Reconstructed Commons for Science and Innovation (2001), at
http://www.law.duke.edu/pd/papers/ReichmanandUhlir.pdf.
41
See id.; J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads:
Recent Developments and their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 793 (1999).
42
See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 40.
43
See id.
44
See id.
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U.K. and, thus, the model may not be attractive as an international
solution.45 In any case, it will be interesting to see both the final
version of this proposal and the reaction of the academic research
community.
The question of access to scientific data is a very emotive
issue. Neither Maurer,46 David,47 nor UNESCO48 suggests that
scientists who benefit from some form of public subsidy
voluntarily eschew intellectual property rights in their inventions
or other rights-bearing vehicles in the way that Reichman and
Uhlir do.49 Some dissenting voices argue that the collaborative
tradition might in fact immunize scientists against the rise of
greater legal protections in databases.50 Dissenters also argue that
the threat of databases’ monopoly pricing upon which scientists
rely is exaggerated and market forces may supply correction.51
These claims complicate matters for decision makers. This author
will resist the temptation to offer his own voice in support of one
position or another to this vexing issue as he has presented the
problem here as indicative of the need to balance access rights to
data in crafting the legal treatment of databases, regardless of
whether protections are framed as proprietary or liability models.
However, this author believes that even this cursory review of the
literature and the positions advanced by interested parties makes it
clear that such questions of public interest exemptions from
liability for scientific research cannot be determined through
abstract questions of the public good by non-interested parties, no
matter how well-meaning, and are complicated by the automatic
entitlements that flow necessarily from a proprietary approach. In
practice, the reliance on proprietary protection, which is an all-or45

See id.
See Maurer, supra note 31.
47
See David, supra note 28.
48
See UNESCO, supra note 38.
49
See Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 40.
50
See, e.g., Michael Freno, Database Protection: Resolving the U.S. Database
Dilemma with an Eye Toward International Protection, 34 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 165, 190
(2001). But see J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51, 115 (1997) (noting that the scientific community shares
data in a way that would protect it from commercial data providers).
51
See Kenneth W. Dam, Intellectual Property and the Academic Enterprise, in THE
CHANGING CHARACTER, USE AND PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 32–33 (1999).
46
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nothing equation absent a specific permission or defense to cover
the specific use, encourages the tendency to shape originality
doctrine to produce a desired consequence. This author suggests
that a more meaningful approach would be one oriented to asking
the more difficult questions (when to protect databases, on what
basis, and to what degree), which does not fit well within an
exclusively proprietary approach.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF DATABASES: CANADIAN AND
COMPARATIVE LAW
Currently, in compliance with international agreements and
established precedent, Canada protects databases through
copyright law, which affords protection to compilations created by
the selection and arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical, or
artistic works (or parts of those works), and to the selection and
arrangement of data as a literary work under the Copyright Act.52
Revision of doctrine regarding the core criterion of originality in
compilations in Canada has been on the horizon in recent years due
to three significant developments: the decision of the United States
Supreme Court in 1991 to alter the construction of the originality
standard under the American statute,53 Canada’s accession to
NAFTA in 1992,54 and the adoption of the Database Directive by
the European Union in 1996.55 This section will examine the
present Canadian copyright protection in the context of the

52
Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42 (2001) (Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Copyright Act],
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-42/text.html. The Canadian Copyright Act was
amended to comply with the North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art.
1705(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA], with respect to defining compilations
through the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act. See North
American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, ch. 44, § 53(3), 1993 S.C. (Can.),
available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/N-23.8/text.html. The Canadian Copyright Act
does preserve protection of tables as compilations, and in the past the two have been used
as inter-changeable terms. See Tele-Direct (Publ’ns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info. Inc., [1998] 2
F.C. 22 (Can. 1997); Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Redwood Music Ltd., 2 All E.R. 817, 820,
824 (H.L. 1980).
53
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
54
Supra note 52.
55
See supra note 3.
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British56 and American approaches and evaluate the utility of a
proprietary approach through the copyright law per se.
It is useful to begin by recognizing that the debate over the
appropriate treatment of databases through copyright is quite
reflective of both the inherent tensions that arise in protecting such
subject matter and the shifting nature of copyright law. This is as
true across jurisdictions as in the Canadian context. The inhibition
that the law places upon those wishing to use what some see as
common cultural property requires a continuing reassessment of
the justification of such intrusion. Various approaches are
commonly advanced and the arguments that are constructed are
shaped by the legal systems and cultures in which they are
rooted.57 Ultimately, dispassionate observers can only conclude
that answers provided by such competing visions necessarily flow
from the manner in which questions are framed, with unfortunate
complications arising for policymakers charged with determining
the public interest. Indeed, that such complications arise in reality
and not merely in theory is well borne out by the unfortunate
division of the Supreme Court of Canada in the recent Theberge
litigation.58 This inability to define a singular justification for
copyright protection (and legal model arising therefrom, a
universal theory of copyright as it were) is no bad thing. To hold
otherwise is to presume that such a singular approach is possible
56

The pre-1998 British law is still relevant to the protection of computer programs.
See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT § 1.1 (2001). Teleological
approaches focus on the economic implications of legal protections for market efficiency
and greater social welfare and proceed based on the desirability of forecasted
consequences. As one might expect, contemporary “law and economics” scholars have
been influential in setting this policy agenda in recent years. Deontological approaches,
whether based on a Kantian concern for the creators of copyrighted works (an ethical
reluctance to regard an author as a means to an end, rather than as an end in herself) or
some Hegelian construction (the creator’s self-identity in a civil society is acknowledged
by others through the property grant in the work that he has created), are creator-centered
and tend to revolve around questions of duty and desert. In copyright, one often finds
these arguments arising when considering the nature of “authorship.”
These
deontological arguments adapt easily to the access-concerned approach that rightly
features on the Internet and in different communities, and fits neatly into much of the
rights-theory scholarship in contemporary legal theory, as well as civilian droit d’auteur
traditions.
58
Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.);
see also infra notes 199, 201.
57
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and desirable. The goal of examining competing models is not to
settle this ongoing debate, but to participate in it. We should think
of the law of copyright as a process to meet diverse aims, rather
than the sole solution to a singular problem.
Copyright doctrine in all three jurisdictions reviewed below—
the United Kingdom,59 the United States,60 and Canada61—reveals
an uncertain and inconsistent level of protection of databases
through artificial construction of the core question of originality,
made worse at times by a liberal sprinkling of legal fiction.
Perhaps of greater concern, the present proprietary models do not
adequately speak to either the economic justification for protection
of databases as copyrightable works; nor do they provide an
adequate structure to balance competing interests regarding such
works. This uncertainty is quite undesirable—it adds expense and
encourages the use of informal protections which are as equally
capable of over-constraining data as more formal models.
A. The International Context
The Berne Convention (hereinafter “Berne”) is the oldest of the
international intellectual property treaties.62 It establishes the
international treatment of copyright protection to give effect to the
core principle of national treatment.63 The treaty seeks to maintain
a system of protection that requires no formalities for copyright,
and where the protection attaches independently of other legal
treatment.64 Berne aims to establish a union of contracting states
in which certain minimum protections are afforded and enforced
for the protection of authors; it does not, however, dictate the
manner in which signatories structure their own laws or the norms
that feature in the national systems of contracting states.65 Berne,
59

See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.C.
61
See infra Part III.D.
62
See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne]. Canada became a signatory
to the Convention as a sovereign power in 1928, and to the latest revision on June 26,
1998, though its law was in substantive compliance.
63
See id.
64
See id.
65
See id.
60
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then, is neutral as to how states effectuate compliance (whether
through enabling legislation or through self-execution), bearing in
mind their own constitutional structures and legal cultures.66 The
Berlin Revision added article 2(5) in 1909, which provides:
Collections of literary and artistic works such as
encyclopaedias and anthologies which, by virtue of the
selection and arrangement of their contents, constitute
intellectual creations, shall be protected as such, without
prejudice to the copyright in each of the works forming part
of such collections.67
There are two points that bear examination: subject matter and
subsistence. In terms of definition, article 2(5) seems tied to
collections of works that are themselves independently protectable
as literary works, rather than mere data.68 It is not entirely clear
whether this restriction is consistent with the earlier provisions of
article 2, which cover the range of protectable subject matter, such
that data may not be included subject to other requirements being
fulfilled.69 There is no authoritative interpretation to settle the
issue. Second, the term “intellectual creation” is used in relation to
collections specifically,70 and not regarding literary works in
general under article 2(1),71 though it does seem to be implicit in
the more generalized provisions.72 The natural question which
arises, and which has featured prominently in the Canadian
jurisprudence regarding similar provisions in NAFTA, is whether
Berne intends a specific standard or whether this is a matter of
national appreciation. The phrase itself is not a matter of agreedupon guidelines within Berne.73 Professor Sam Ricketson’s
66

See SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 at 130–31 (1987); WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW 20 (R. Livingston trans.,
1990) (1977).
67
Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(5).
68
See id.
69
See DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS
82 (1998).
70
See Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(5).
71
See id. art. 2(1).
72
See id.
73
See Berne, supra note 62.
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authoritative analysis is that Berne is a matter to be left to
signatory states for implementation, notwithstanding that differing
results might occur in the protection of factual compilations.74
Ricketson concludes that the Berne Convention is cognizant of the
common law approach to copyright that might accommodate unfair
competition norms, despite its debasement of a purer concept of
creativity-centered authorship.75
As part of the general trend to international approximation, if
not harmonization of laws, an augmented version of the Berne
standard has been brought into both TRIPS, administered by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), and the WIPO Copyright
Treaty in largely the same terms.76 These treaties incorporate and
build upon the existing Berne standards, and in relation to
databases, represent a codification of existing practice rather than
creation of new norms,77 except in so far as they mandate the
inclusion of compilations of data within the protection of literary
works.78 While some argue that TRIPS departs from the general
rule, leaving questions of originality to contracting states by tying
a substantive standard to the selection and arrangement of data,79
resolution of this issue is far from clear and this author would
dispute the conclusion that it is now definitively settled.
The important point in considering these various international
and regional dimensions of intellectual property protection is to
74

See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 301; J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW
254–55 (1998).
75
See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 901; Sam Ricketson, “Reaping Without Sowing”:
Unfair Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, 7 U. NEW
S. WALES L.J. 1 (1984).
76
See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, April 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization [hereinafter
WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]; WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 5, 36
I.L.M. 65 (1997) (adopted in Geneva, Dec. 20, 1996), available at
http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/wo033en.htm.
77
See MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 50 (1996).
78
See Paul Katzenberger, TRIPS and Copyright Law, in FROM GATT TO TRIPS—THE
AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 84–85
(Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
79
See Sunny Handa, A Review of Canada’s International Copyright Obligations, 42
MCGILL L.J. 961, 976–78 (1997).
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differentiate what is a minimum standard of protection from what
is required by national jurisdictions as a mandatory method in
providing that minimum threshold of protection. These treaties
mandate neither a creativity-linked nor an industrious collection
standard; they merely assert the traditional position that data are
not independently protectable subject-matter in copyright as these
individual items necessarily fail to meet the requirement that they
be the product of the author’s own efforts. An argument that one
approach or another stems from these international agreements
fails to address the desirability of a proprietary approach to the
problems inherent in protecting factual collections and ignores the
systemic dimensions of national copyright protection.
B. The United Kingdom
It is beyond the scope of this paper to try and present a
historical analysis of the protection of compilations as literary
works in British copyright law.80 What can be taken from an
analysis is that from a general interest in protecting mental labor
and creativity in the older cases there developed a more refined,
more mercantile, and more pragmatic attempt to bring some
doctrinal order to a morass of judgments and statutes relevant to
copyright protection in the latter half of the 19th century.81 As
today, much of this change was part of an international agenda of
reform that was market and technology-driven.82 Thus, just as
copyright in the first copyright statute, the Statute of Anne,83 was a
legislative reaction to the new technology of movable type, the
first (but confined) statutory requirement of originality was the
legislative reaction to Daguerre’s invention of a chemical process

80

It is a large subject due to a myriad of pre-modern cases and interested readers would
do well to consult Sherman and Bentley’s fine history of British intellectual property law
thru 1911 to gain an overall appreciation of developments in this area. See BRAD
SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
(1999).
81
See id.
82
See WIPO, INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEORY AND PRACTICE 385
(1997).
83
1709, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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to develop photographic plates in 1839.84 Development of the
originality standard became tied up with both the protection of
creativity and investment; however, it was the latter value that
came to dominate when the requirement became of general
application in the codification of existing jurisprudence for the
copyright protection of literary, dramatic, musical and artistic
works in the Copyright Act of 1911.85 The 1911 Act was also
significant in that it expressed for the first time in statute form that
“compilations” were protectable as literary works, 86 though there
was a good deal of litigation that settled the point in the affirmative
from very early on.87
For present purposes, it is sufficient to present a model of the
current doctrine. It is important to note that original compilations
(other than databases) remain protectable as literary works under
the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.88 The terms of the
Database Directive exclude the protection of computer programs
from its operation, and thus, the situation that existed before the
implementation of the Database Directive continues with regard to
software.89 Given the wide definition of a database in the
Directive,90 whether there is any scope in the statute for
compilations that are neither databases nor computer programs
seems to be an open question.
The 1988 Act provides that copyright may subsist in original
literary works in the form of tables or compilations (other than
databases);91 similar provisions existed in the 191192 and 195693
84

See Graves’s Case, 4 L.R.-Q.B. 715, 715 (Eng. 1869) (holding the Fine Art
Copyright Act 1862 required originality respecting the protection of paintings, drawings,
and photographs).
85
Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.).
86
See id.
87
Interestingly for lawyers, much of that case law concerned law reports. See, e.g.,
Sweet v. Benning, 139 Eng. Rep. 838 (C.P. 1855); Hodges v. Smith & Welsh, 2 Ir. Eq.
266 (1840); Sweet v. Maugham, 59 Eng. Rep. 793 (V.C 1840); Sweet v. Shaw, 8 L.J.R.
216 (Eng. Ch. 1839); Saunders v. Smith, 40 Eng. Rep. 1100 (Ch. 1838); Butterworth v.
Robinson, 31 Eng. Rep. 817 (Ch. 1801); Gyles v. Wilcox, 26 Eng. Rep. 489 (Ch. 1740).
88
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 1, § 3(1) (Eng.) [hereinafter Copyright
Act of 1988].
89
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3.
90
See id.
91
See Copyright Act of 1988.
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Acts. No definition is given to the terms “original literary work,”
“table,” or “compilation.”94 The differences between tables and
While a
compilations are implicitly regarded as slight.95
compilation is a collected body of material where the author’s
contribution is found in the arrangement, selection or collection of
the various elements, a table is a systematic listing of facts with the
contribution of the author found in the design or choice of the
organizing system.96 The two terms obviously overlap and for that
reason the term compilation is used generically in the cases.97
While there is a great deal of authority on the presence or
absence of originality in compilations, the definitional issue is not
featured as a controlling device. Courts have held that the
elements included within the compilation need not themselves be
independently protectable in copyright and all types of subject
matter can be included.98
92

See Copyright Act of 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46, § 35(1) (Eng.).
See Copyright Act of 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 74, § 48(1) (Eng.).
94
See Copyright Act of 1988.
95
See KEVIN GARNETT ET AL., COPINGER & SKONE JAMES ON COPYRIGHT 62–65 (13th
ed. 1991).
96
See id.; 1 HUGH LADDIE ET AL., THE MODERN LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS 67
(3d ed. 2000).
97
See GARNETT ET AL., supra note 95, at 62–63.
98
See, e.g., Matthewson v. Stockdale, 33 Eng. Rep. 103 (Ch. 1806) (receipt books);
Church v. Linton, [1894] 25 O.R. 131 (Can.) (receipt books); Blacklock v. Pearson,
[1915] 2 Ch. 376 (Eng.) (index of timetables); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep. 1294
(1857) (questions and answers on matters of scientific interest); Collis v. Cater, 78 L.T.R.
613 (Eng. 1898) (trade catalogues); Purefoy v. Sykes Boxall, 72 R.P.C. 89 (Eng. 1955)
(trade catalogues); Maple & Co. v. Junior Army and Navy Stores, 21 Ch. D. 369 (Eng.
1882) (advertisements with trading details); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866)
(street directories); Morris v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng. 1868) (street directories);
Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.)
(lists of football fixtures); Football League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.) (coupons
listing football wagers); Ibcos Computers Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275 (Eng. Ch.) (computer
programs); Cantor Fitzgerald Int’l v. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd., 2000 R.P.C 95 (Eng. Ch.
1999) (computer programs); Mars U.K. Ltd. v. Teknowledge Ltd. (No.1) 2000 F.S.R 138
(Eng. Ch.) (computer programs); Kenrick v. Danube Collieries, 39 W.R. 473 (Eng. Ch.
1891) (mining reports); Stevens & Sons v. Waterlow & Sons Ltd., 41 JP 37 (Eng. Ch. D.
1877) (trade information); Cox v. Land and Water Journal Co., 9 L.R.-Eq. 324 (Eng.
1869) (hunting information); Independent Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd., 1984
F.S.R 64 (Eng. Ch.) (television listings); Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough and
District Tradesmen’s Protection Ass’n, 40 Ch. D. 425 (Eng. 1889) (details of land sales
and deeds); Nisbet (J.) & Co. Ltd. v. The Golf Agency, 23 T.L.R. 370 (Eng. 1907)
93
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The construction of the originality requirement in British
copyright law is clearly not one that seeks to set the high
creativity-linked standard of civilian droit d’auteur systems as a
minimum threshold, but operates as a de minimus control to filter
out that which lacks even the slightest literary composition with
reference to the skill, judgment and labor expended by the author
in the creation of the work.99 It is, as it is widely regarded, a
“sweat of the brow” standard.100 The most oft-cited description of
the dominant British approach to the originality requirement is that
of Judge Peterson in University of London Press Ltd. v. Universal
Tutorial Press Ltd.:
The word “original” does not in this connection mean that
the work must be the expression of original or inventive
thought. Copyright Acts are not concerned with the
originality of ideas, but with the expression of thought, and,
in the case of “literary work,” with the expression of
thought in print or writing. The originality which is
required relates to the expression of the thought. But the
Act does not require that the expression must be in an
original or novel form, but that the work must not be copied
from another work -it should originate from the author.101
Clearly, the construction of the originality requirement does not
speak to any required reflection of the personality of the author in
the work, nor novelty of thought. Further, it is not aided by the
types of American “copyrightability” concerns that prevent certain
types of expressions from being characterized as anything more
than an unprotectable idea. Copyright in the functional field is
used to compensate for the lack of what Professor Cornish has
sometimes called “a roving concept of unfair competition,”102 and
(biographical details of golfers); Weatherby & Sons v. Int’l Horse Agency and Exch.
Ltd., [1910] 2 Ch. 297 (Eng.) (horse breeding details); J. Whitaker & Sons Ltd. v.
Publishers’ Circular Ltd., 1946 Mac. C.C. 10 (Eng. K.B.) (a list of books); Leslie v.
Young, 1894 A.C. 335 (Eng.) (a list of railway stations).
99
See Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal Tutorial Press Ltd., [1916] 2 Ch. 601,
608 (Eng.); Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 291 (Eng.); Walter v. Lane, 1900
A.C. 539 (Eng.).
100
Univ. of London Press, [1916] 2 Ch. at 601.
101
Id. at 608–09.
102
See generally W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1996).
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is reflective of a pragmatic and practical approach in a system that
has a mercantile rather than natural-rights based orientation. Not
coincidentally, the same conceptual problems that are raised
regarding the utility of a tort of unfair competition103 are raised
regarding the originality requirement with respect to compilations.
The idiosyncratic, subjective judicial scrutiny of the micromorality of certain types of transactions through a generalized tort,
as well as a more transparent approach to the issues when obscured
in the language of copyright are avoided.
What is required, then, for subsistence, is a showing of
“substantial labour, skill, or judgment,”104 which need not be
large,105 just more than a trivial effort.106 However, there is no real
guiding principle as to the extent and nature of this desired
effort.107 In the case of compilations, merely selecting the
elements for inclusion, such as quotations from an interview, will
suffice.108 The difficulty, of course, is in leaving the disposition of
the issue on such terms to the trier of fact where, in Lord
MacMillan’s words, “the question must always be one of degree
and on questions of degree different minds may naturally reach
different conclusions.”109 Although flexibility is preferred to
certainty, it causes higher administrative costs in the functional
field that are ultimately borne by consumers.
In terms of infringement, the action was once brought under
one of two theories, piracy (unauthorized and substantial copying)
or literary larceny (“the illegitimate appropriation of the fruits of
the author’s labor embodied in” the work).110 The law now
103

See Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2), [1984] 156 C.L.R. 414
(Austl.); MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd., [1976] 66 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can.); ANSELM
KAMPERMAN SANDERS, UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW 52–54 (1997).
104
Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 285–88.
105
See LADDIE ET AL., supra note 96, at 86.
106
See Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng. Ch.).
107
See Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch.
1928).
108
See Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1320 (Eng. Ch.);
Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273.
109
G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.);
Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng. Ch.).
110
J.B. RICHARDSON, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 101 (1913); see also Dicks v. Yates, 18
Ch. D. 76, 90 (Eng. 1881).
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combines the two—one may copy an insubstantial amount from
the compilation, but beyond that lies the possibility of liability for
infringement.111 Thus the balancing device of substantiality
becomes important.112 The classic statement of the substantiality
test was given by Lord Pearce in Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v.
William Hill (Football) Ltd.: “Whether a part is substantial must be
decided by its quality rather than its quantity.” 113 Recently, Lord
Hoffmann elaborated, holding that a purposive approach must be
taken:
But what quality is one looking for? That question, as it
seems to me, must be answered by reference to the reason
why the work is given copyright protection. In literary
copyright for example, copyright is conferred (irrespective
of literary merit) upon an original literary work. It follows
that the quality relevant for the purposes of substantiality is
the literary originality of that which has been copied. In the
case of an artistic work, it is the artistic originality of that
which has been copied.114
Given that the originality requirement looks to the substantial
labor, skill, or judgment expended by the author in the
arrangement, selection or collection of the various elements in
compilations, substantiality mirrors the originality inquiry in
considering whether the copying constitutes an infringement
through an over-borrowing or misappropriation of that same
investment.115 The basic consideration then becomes whether the
copyist has conveyed the unprotected facts to the public in a
manner that has misappropriated the author’s investment in his
own conveyance of those same facts.116 Merely re-ordering the

111

See, e.g., Ladbroke (Football), [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273.
See id. at 276–77, 283, 288, 293.
113
Id. at 293.
114
Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] 3 W.L.R. 290,
296–97 (Eng.).
115
See id.
116
See Pike v. Nicolas, 5 L.R.-Ch. 251 (Eng. 1869); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep.
1294, 1298 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081 (1839).
112
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material or using different language to present it will be
insufficient to forestall a finding of liability.117
A prime difficulty arises concerning the strength of this
mechanism, specifically with regard to information that is not
otherwise available, or even where otherwise available and the
copyist is lead to the source through the original.118 In Football
League v. Littlewoods, the plaintiffs owned a copyright in the
compilation of the scheduling of football fixtures.119 The court
found that making the chronological list was not difficult but
required hard work and painstaking accuracy.120 The defendants
sent their customers coupons containing lists of fixtures, which
were admittedly copied from the League’s chronological list.121
Although the information was not available from any other source,
infringement was found.122 The refusal to license is more properly
seen as a competition concern rather than a copyright matter and
must ultimately be resolved through competition regulation; this is
important in terms of both the domestic economy in isolation, and
in the context of a regional arrangement such as the European
Union which is based on the free movement of goods and
services.123
Again, the matter becomes one of case-by-case analysis framed
as a question of fact rather than law.124 It is suggested that there is
no binding principle that narrows the general inquiry or makes the

117

See Bell v. Whitehead, 8 L.J.R.141 (Eng. 1839); Whittingham v. Wooler, 36 Eng.
Rep. 679 (1817).
118
See Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866) (where the copyist sent agents to
verify the addresses and details of places noted in the plaintiff’s original street directory);
Morris v. Wright, 5 L.R.-Ch. 279 (Eng. 1870); Morris v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng.
1868).
119
1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.). See also Independent Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd.,
1984 F.S.R 64 (Eng. Ch.) (holding that television and radio listings constituted
compilations and were thus protected as literary copyright works due to the extent of skill
and labor involved in this creation).
120
See Football League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637, 639 (Eng.).
121
See id.
122
See id.
123
See Radio Telefis Eireann v. E.C. Comm’n of the European Communities, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 718.
124
See G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.);
Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng. Ch.).
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analysis more predictable.125 The resolution of such issues is very
much a question of evidence to determine; to draw on the words of
Page Wood V.C., whether the defendant has taken away the
plaintiff’s labor expended in producing the work, 126 with the
competitive nexus between the parties being quite influential in the
application of the substantiality test.127 Despite these problems, it
is interesting to note that this traditional “sweat of the brow” or
“industrious collection” approach was recently followed in
Australia.128
C. The United States
Although American copyright law is quite similar to its British
progenitor, there are quite substantial differences in the protection
of functional works such as factual compilations. First, the federal
protection is constitutionally based and is subject to the fixed
jurisdictional boundaries necessary in such a federal system, and
thus sits alongside state misappropriation protection.129 Second,
since at least Baker v. Selden,130 American copyright law has
constructed the “idea-expression dichotomy” as a controlling
device in the development of copyright doctrine and the types of
works and the nature of authorship that legitimately falls within the
constitutional grant.131 Though courts have been known to adopt a
more pragmatic stance,132 there is a systemic reluctance to protect
125

See id.
See Scott v. Sandford, [1867] 3 L.R.-Eq. 718, 723–24 (Eng.).
127
See Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough and District Tradesmen’s Protection
Ass’n, 40 Ch. D. 425, 428–429 (Eng. 1889); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697, 701–703
(Eng. 1866).
128
See Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Marketing Sys. Pty Ltd. [2001] FCA 612, aff’d,
[2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112 (Austl.).
129
See, e.g., Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1919).
130
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
131
See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
132
See Chuck Blore & Don Richman, Inc. v. 20/20 Adver. Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671, 676
(D. Minn. 1987) (“The first axiom of copyright is that copyright protection covers only
the expression of ideas and not ideas themselves. . . . The second axiom of copyright is
that the first axiom is more of an amorphous characterization than it is a principled
guidepost.”).
126
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the purely functional rather than the creative (some may say
wisely).133 This differing approach to functional expression is
clearly brought out in the American134 and British135 approaches to
the protection of computer programs. While the former places a
clear emphasis on questions of authorship and subsistence of
copyright and uses such doctrines as merger136 and scenes à
faire137 to limit “copyrightability” as a matter of law, the British
law concentrates its attention at the substantiality stage and the
determination of the issues through questions of fact.138 This
author would hazard to state, however, that both reach the same
conclusions in the majority of cases. Third, unlike British law
which (usually) prizes certainty far above flexibility and which
does not favor generalized public interest defenses, American law
clearly speaks to copyright as a flexible property right which is
granted in the public interest and which must be construed and

133

See Ibcos Computers Ltd., 1994 F.S.R. 275, 291–92 (Eng. Ch.) (discussing the
refusal of United States copyright law to protect solely functional elements).
134
See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995);
Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
135
See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald Int’l v. Tradition (U.K.) Ltd., 2000 R.P.C 95 (Eng. Ch.).
136
See Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir.
1990); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986).
137
See, e.g., Mitel, Inc. v. Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
138
See, e.g., Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer plc, [2001] 3
W.L.R. 290, 296–97 (Eng.); Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109,
116 (Eng. Ch.); Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng.
Ch.); Radio Telefis Eireann v. E.C. Comm’n of the European Communities, [1995] 4
C.M.L.R. 718 (Eng.); Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R.
1320 (Eng. Ch.); Independent Television Publ’ns Ltd. v. Time Out Ltd., 1984 F.S.R 64
(Eng. Ch.); Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No. 2), [1984] 156 C.L.R.
414 (Austl.); MacDonald v. Vapour Canada Ltd., [1976] 66 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can.); Ladbroke
(Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R. 273 (Eng.); Football
League v. Littlewoods, 1959 Ch. 637 (Eng.); G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank
Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial
Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch.) 1928; Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal
Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch. 601, 608 (Eng.); Trade Auxiliary Co. v. Middlesbrough
and District Tradesmen’s Protection Ass’n, 40 Ch. D. 425, 428–29 (Eng. 1889); Morris v.
Wright, 5 L.R.-Ch. 279 (Eng. 1870); Pike v. Nicolas, 5 L.R.-Ch. 251 (Eng. 1869); Morris
v. Ashbee, 7 L.R.-Eq. 34 (Eng. 1868); Scott v. Sandford, 3 L.R.-Eq. 718, 723–24 (Eng.
1867); Kelly v. Morris, 1 L.R.-Eq. 697 (Eng. 1866); Jarrold v. Houlston, 69 Eng. Rep.
1294, 1298 (1857); Lewis v. Fullarton, 48 Eng. Rep. 1080, 1081 (1839); Bell v.
Whitehead, 8 L.J.R.141 (Eng. 1839); Whittingham v. Wooler, 36 Eng. Rep. 679 (1817).
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applied to serve the public interest.139 This is more than a doctrinal
difference; it is a matter of legal culture determining where
balancing decisions will be made, by whom they will be made, and
whether these decisions ought to be made in the context of private
litigation. It is a characteristic of fundamental importance in the
American system, and a fundamental difference to other common
law copyright regimes.
Like British law, American law treats the compilation and its
contents separately. Unlike British law, American law hesitates
over the manner in which copyright might attach to facts. Both
systems may protect elements of a compilation as original literary
works in their own right, however, facts are not considered to be
copyrightable subject-matter per se in the United States,140 based
on constructions of the idea-expression dichotomy,141 again
through such devices as the merger doctrine142 and conceptions of
authorship.143 Since copyright protection of compilations is “thin,”
these fact considerations become quite significant. This system
differs from the British law, where the issue is framed merely as
one of originality in the sense of conveying information or
instruction without need to deny the protection merely as it might
protect a fact.144
139

Hence, the importance of the quasi-equitable fair use defense, which is especially
significant in the institutional balancing of protection and access interests. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (2000) (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction
in copies or phonorecords . . . , for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an
infringement of copyright.”); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
140
See Nester’s Map & Guide Corp. v. Hagstrom Map Co., 796 F. Supp. 729 (E.D.N.Y.
1992) (holding that although facts themselves cannot be copyrighted, the presentation of
facts will be protected where the creator has demonstrated sufficient creativity).
141
See Harper & Row Publisher, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
142
However, it is clear that where there is more than one way to express a fact and that
the expression in question can be said to reflect creative choices in presentation, the
merger doctrine can be overcome and copyright may subsist under the American statute.
See generally CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61
(2d Cir. 1994); Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
143
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
344–45 (1991).
144
See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Int’l Ltd., [1981] 3 W.L.R. 541
(Eng. C.A.). The approach in Canada is less onerous in that only an expression of an idea
is required. See, e.g., Int’l Bus. Machines Corp. v. Spirales Computers Inc., [1984] 12
D.L.R.4th 351 (Can.).
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With respect to compilations, the Copyright Act of 1976
provides that “a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or
arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship”145 may be protected.146
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,147 Rural
Telephone Services published local yellow and white page
directories for its subscribers.148 Rural was bound to do so under
state law.149 Feist sought to license the data and to release its own
directory, but to include a larger catchment area than Rural
Telephone’s directory and thus attract a different class of
consumers.150 Rural refused to license the information,151 and
Feist copied the listings without authorization to do so.152 Feist
went further and took steps to verify Rural’s collection as accurate
before using the data within its own directory.153 The United
States Supreme Court applied a creativity-linked standard based on
the construction of the federal power to legislate in the area of
intellectual property as one directed at the public interest in
encouraging new works, rather than merely protecting the
investment of resources in the work at issue.154 In a famous
passage, Justice O’Connor wrote:
This case concerns the interaction of two wellestablished propositions. The first is that facts are not
copyrightable; the other, that compilations of facts
generally are. . . .
The key to resolving the tension lies in understanding
why facts are not copyrightable. The sine qua non of
145

17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining compilations).
See id. § 103(a) (including compilations in literary works).
147
499 U.S. 340 (1991).
148
Id. at 340.
149
See id. at 363.
150
See id. at 343.
151
See id. This was held in violation of antitrust principles by the district court. See
Rural Tel. Serv. Co. Inc. v. Feist Publ’ns Inc., 737 F. Supp. 610 (D. Kan. 1990), rev’d,
957 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1992).
152
See Feist, 499 U.S. at 343.
153
See id. at 343–44.
154
See id. at 349.
146

2-FREEDMAN FORMAT

2002]

12/12/02 1:03 PM

SHOULD CANADA ENACT A NEW DATABASE RIGHT?

65

copyright is originality.
To qualify for copyright
protection, a work must be original to the author. Original,
as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work
was independently created by the author (as opposed to
copied from other works), and that it possesses at least
some minimal degree of creativity. To be sure, the
requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight
amount will suffice.
....
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the
compiler’s labor may be used by others without
compensation. As Justice Brennan has correctly observed,
however, this is not “some unforeseen byproduct of a
statutory scheme.” It is, rather, “the essence of copyright,”
and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of
copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.” To this
end, copyright assures authors the right to their original
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the
ideas and information conveyed by a work . . . . This
principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression
dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As applied
to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original
written expression, only the compiler’s selection and
arrangement may be protected; the raw facts may be copied
at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortunate. It is
the means by which copyright advances the progress of
science and art.155
Thus, an original work of authorship under the copyright
statute is the product of the author’s own efforts and includes at
least some minimal degree of creativity.156 The creativity standard
here is not akin to the “author’s own intellectual creation”
standard, as in those civilian systems in which the personality of
the author must be reflected in the work, but furthers the same
155
156

Id. at 345, 349–50 (citations omitted).
See id. at 349.
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policy goals that are familiar to British copyright: rewarding the
judgment and taste of the author through the copyright grant, and
encouraging others to act likewise, but in no case making
unavailable the general ideas or discrete matters of fact that ought
to be available to them.157 The protection encourages and supports
a principled construction of authorship, not ownership of
knowledge.158
In enforcing this “modicum of creativity” approach, the
experience post-Feist has not been an unduly restrictive one—as
one court put it, copyright protection in compilations may be
thin,159 “but not anorexic.”160 Thus, original compilations have
been protected in the form of directories of businesses,161 lists of
the statistics of baseball pitchers on nine selected criteria,162 a
model building code,163 facts for software user interface,164 guides
to the used prices of cars165 and collectible coins,166 and codes and
descriptions of dental procedures.167

157

See, e.g., id. at 340.
See, e.g., id.
159
That is, protection is restricted to the original parts of the compilation’s selection,
coordination, or arrangement.
160
See Key Publ’n, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ’g Enters., 945 F.2d 509, 514 (2d Cir.
1991).
161
See EPM Communications, Inc. v. Notara, Inc., 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144
(S.D.N.Y. 2000); Key Publ’n, Inc., 945 F.2d at 509.
162
See Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1991).
163
See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Congress Int’l, Inc., 158 F.3d 693 (5th Cir. 2001).
164
See Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335 (5th Cir. 1994).
165
See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2d Cir.
1994).
166
See CDN, Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999).
167
See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977 (7th Cir. 1997).
Reports of judgments have been refused protection, see Matthew Bender & Co. v. West
Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998); Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158
F.3d 693 (2d Cir. 1998); but see Oasis Publ’g Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 924 F. Supp. 918
(D. Minn. 1996); as have a yellow pages directory, see Bellsouth Adver. & Publ’g Corp.
v. Donnelly Info. Publ’g, Inc., 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir. 1993); but see Warren Publ’g v.
Microdos Data, Inc., 53 F.3d 950 (11th Cir. 1995); a list of part numbers automatically
created with the manufacturer’s numbering system, see Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge
Corp., 258 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2001); charters of horse racing statistics, see Victor Lalli
Enter. Inc. v. Big Red Apple, Inc., 936 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1991); and a Hebrew bible
with symbols to permit searches in compliance with Jewish law, see Torah Soft Ltd. v.
Drosnin, 136 F. Supp. 2d 276 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
158
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The requisite creative efforts may be expended upon the
selection of the data.168 As the selection must be creative, there is
an obvious problem in automatic selection of all relevant data—for
example, the telephone directory in Feist itself169—or selection
criteria that is in and of itself unoriginal.170 Equally obvious is that
where there are creative choices in using unoriginal criteria, the
requisite modicum of creativity will be shown.171 Thus, a list of
“best” objects as selected by the author will do.172 With regard to
co-coordinating and arranging data, the same considerations of
automatic factors like page numbering 173 and unoriginal criteria
apply with the additional control of the merger doctrine.174
Creative choices in selecting the right fact in the right way will
satisfy the requirement of minimal creativity.175
The degree to which the Feist standard has improved the law is
certainly open to debate, and the paradox in relying on a creativity
norm as a means of encouraging more utilitarian works in the form
of “creative” factual compilations (which by their very nature may
intrude on the objective veracity of the contents presented), has not
gone unnoticed.176 The result is to leave protection of databases in
an uncertain state, complicated by varying interpretations of the
Feist decision in the various federal circuits.177 This institutional
168

See Tora Soft, 136 F. Supp. 2d at 278.
See Feist Publ’n, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
170
See id. at 349.
171
See O.P. Solutions, Inc. v. Intellectual Prop. Network, Ltd., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1818 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (holding that format accorded with industry convention was not
sufficiently original).
172
Id. at 1820.
173
See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674 (2d Cir. 1998).
174
See id. at 683.
175
See C.D.N., Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the process of
pricing coins satisfied required degree of creativity).
176
E.g., Jane Ginsburg, U.S. Initiatives to Protect Works of Low Authorship, in
EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY FOR THE
KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 55 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001).
177
Compare Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp., 258 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 2001)
(holding that part numbers lacked sufficient creativity to merit copyright protection), and
Am. Dental Ass’n v. Delta Dental Plans Ass’n, 126 F.3d 977, 979–80 (7th Cir. 1997)
(holding that taxonomy of dental procedures was copyrightable), with Warren Publ’g v.
Microdos Data, Inc., 52 F.3d 950, 954 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated by 115 F.3d 1509 (11th
Cir. 1997).
169
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uncertainty propels the wary businessperson to seek support
elsewhere—in contract178 or misappropriation179 (which would not
appear to be a spent force as far as time-sensitive dynamic
databases are concerned),180 as well as whatever proprietary-based
cause is applicable under the circumstances.181 Based on the
uncertain nature of ancillary actions at the state level,182 the
efficacy and cost of technological self-help measures,183 and the
presence of the EU Database Directive with its reciprocity

178

See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a shrinkwrap license is a binding contract).
179
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 (1991) (stating that
misappropriation may still apply to facts). After Feist, the state misappropriation action
can only be maintained if it protects intellectual property not within the subject matter of
copyright and/or asserts rights not equivalent to copyright. More will be required, in
particular timeliness if the claim seeks to analogize to the generally accepted “hot-news”
doctrine articulated in Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
Compare Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 845 (2d Cir. 1997)
(limiting the “hot news” exception to cases where information generated at a cost to the
plaintiff and is time sensitive, the defendant’s use constitutes free-riding, the parties are
in direct competition and free-riding creates a disincentive that threatens production of
the product), and Fred Wehrenberg Circuit of Theatres, Inc. v. Moviefone, Inc., 73 F.
Supp. 2d 1044, 1050 (E.D. Mo. 1999) (holding that while the state would allow cause of
action based on misappropriation of “hot news,” the plaintiffs failed to satisfy the criteria
laid out in National Basketball Association, 105 F. 3d at 845), with Pollstar v. Gigmania
Ltd. 170 F. Supp. 2d 974, 979–80 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (applying “hot news” elements
outlined in National Basketball Association, 105 F. 3d at 845). See also United States
Golf Ass’n [USGA] v. Arroyo Software Corp., 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1979, 1985 (Cal.
1999) (holding that the USGA’s claims are not pre-empted by federal copyright law).
180
See Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of
Databases in the United States and Abroad (1997), 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 157–64
(1997) (discussing the possible application of the “hot news” exception and
misappropriation theory to databases).
181
See eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1069–70 (N.D. Cal.
2000) (holding that eBay would likely prevail on its assertion that Bidder’s Edge
interfered with eBay’s possessory interest in its electronic database); Ticketmaster Corp.
v. Tickets.com Inc., 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1344, 1347 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (granting motion
to dismiss claims of misappropriation and trespass of factual information posted on
website); Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 238, 251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding
that party would likely prevail on claim of trespass to chattels where defendant used a
software “robot” to collect information from competitor’s database).
182
See Amy C. Sullivan, When the Creative is the Enemy of the True: Database
Protection in the U.S. and Abroad, 29 AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N Q.J., 346–52
(2001).
183
See id. at 345.
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provision,184 a number of proposals have suggested legislative
reform to construct sui generis protection of databases in the
United States (though such proposals languish in Congress).185
D. Canada
As in other jurisdictions, the protection of factual compilations
in Canadian law has emphasized the difficulties in determining
originality in this form of utilitarian subject matter. However, the
most recent cases, arising in part from the tensions inherent in
Canada’s bijural tradition and the influence of American law on
domestic doctrine, have tended to complicate matters by
alternatively pulling towards and pushing away from conceptions
of creative authorship in general and specifically with regard to
compilations of factual material. In the process, the law has
become uncertain both in doctrine and direction. The cases seem
to say that “intellectual creation” as used in the definition of a
“compilation” under the statute186 requires self-generation (not
copying from another) and “something in addition to not being
copied.”187 Much like the British jurisprudence, with which
Canadian law in the main aligns itself,188 that “something more” is
an indistinct category (it may now include creativity in addition to
the usual vagaries such as taste, discretion, skill, judgment,
industry and labor), ensuring that the investment of resources and
effort is of the right sort and controls the extent of the entitlement

184

See id. at 354.
See, e.g., The Database Investment and Intellectual Antipiracy Act of 1996, H.R.
3531, 104th Cong.; The Consumer and Investor Access to Information Act of 1999, H.R.
1858, 106th Cong.; The Collections of Information Antipiracy Act of 1999, H.R. 2652,
106th Cong. See Sullivan, supra note 182, at 356–71; Ginsburg, supra note 176, at 55.
186
Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 2 (2001) (“‘[C]ompilation’ means (a) a
work resulting from the selection or arrangement of literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic
works or of parts thereof, or (b) a work resulting from the selection or arrangement of
data.”).
187
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385,
para. 214 (Can.) (Rothstein, J.A., concurring); see also id. para. 55 (noting that it also
requires “something more than merely copying” existing elements).
188
See CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th at 385; U&R Tax Services v. H&R Block
Canada Ltd., [1995] C.P.R. 257, 264 (Can.); Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed Co. v.
Sleep-King Adjustable Bed Co., [1984] 3 C.P.R.3d 81, 84 (Can.).
185
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that might be claimed in such subject-matter.189 In essence, like
British law prior to the Database Directive, the Canadian law
recognizes that the further one gets away from traditional literary
works, the inter-related questions of subsistence and infringement
are difficult to determine in the circumstances of an individual case
and, particularly so in factual compilations.190 Again, like British
doctrine, it is hard to pin down exactly what the magical quality of
“something more” is with any precision. The present copyright
revision exercise, though framed in terms of the agenda set out
through the substantive provisions of the relevant WIPO treaties,
may yet settle the issue of database protection more satisfactorily
than the judges have been able to do thus far within the constraints
of the Copyright Act.191
As a preliminary matter, it is worthwhile to consider the nature
of the right set out in the Copyright Act.192 Like the 1911 British
statute on which it was originally modeled, the Canadian statute
creates a right to control reproduction and exploitation of various
forms of protectable expression (not all requiring originality).193
Unlike other jurisdictions, however, Canadian courts have been
quite reluctant to label the right as a proprietary one, preferring to
characterize it as simply a “statutory right.”194 Notwithstanding,
this author would suggest that the protection created under the
Canadian statute is indeed proprietary in the conventional sense.
Though created by statute in relation to an intangible, the right
sufficiently satisfies the traditional incidents of ownership under
189

See Slumber-Magic Adjustable Bed, 3 C.P.R.3d at 84.
Cf. id. para. 55; Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, para. 42 (Can.).
191
See Canadian Copyright Act.
192
See id.
193
See Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161
(Can.); id. para. 114 (Gonthier, J., dissenting).
194
The Canadian Copyright Act is somewhat exceptional in not defining, but treating,
the right as a property right. As Canadian Supreme Court Justice Estey has noted,
“copyright law is neither tort law nor property law in classification, but is statutory law.
It neither cuts across existing rights in property or conduct nor falls in between rights and
obligations heretofore existing in the common law. Copyright legislation simply creates
rights and obligations upon the terms and in the circumstances set out in the statute. This
creature of statute has been known to the law of England at least since the days of Queen
Anne when the first copyright statute was passed. It does not assist the interpretative
analysis to import tort concepts. The legislation speaks for itself . . . .” Compo Co. v.
Blue Crest Music Inc., [1980] S.C.R. 357, 372–73 (Can.).
190
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the so-called “Hohfeld/Honoré orthodoxy”; that is, the rights of
possession, use, management, and the reception of income; the
power to transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the immunity from
expropriation by the state; and liability for execution of a judgment
are all present in relation to the right.195 At the same time, the right
is not a creature of common law nor is it unlimited in term or
extent; like a patent, the right is limited by time and statutory (and
perhaps equitable) defenses operate to limit its enforcement.
While the judicial disinclination to apply the term property to the
right obviously reflects a pragmatic concern for the delicate
balancing of interests that is the essence of intellectual property
law, this author would suggest that withholding the property label
starts the analysis on the wrong foot.
Property, properly understood, is not such a rigid concept that
its application to copyright automatically alters the balance
between the provision of economic incentives to create protectable
expression and legitimate interests in the dissemination of such
works;196 in other words, it need not be seen as concluding rather
than beginning an inquiry into the proper balancing of competing
interests.197 Moreover, given the definitional clarity derived from
the statute and the internal provision of criminal proscriptions, the
sorts of concerns that arise in relation to an indefinite category of
valuable intangibles like confidential information198 do not arise
195

See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 21–23 (1913) (discussing the malleability of the
term property to designate a physical object and/or a right with relation to the object);
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
26 YALE L.J. 710, 722–25 (1917). For a criticism of Hohfeld’s analysis of the correlative
rights and duties in respect to both in rem and in personam rights, see JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY (1988); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83
IOWA L. REV. 277, 284–97 (1998); J.E. Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 724–732 (1996). For a discussion of Hohfeld’s
analysis, see UGO MATTEI, BASIC PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC INTRODUCTION (2000); STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 22
(1990); A.M. Honoré, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 109 (A.G. Guest
ed., 1961).
196
Théberge, 17 C.P.R.4th para. 30 (approving Justice Willes’s famous dicta in Millar
v. Taylor, [1769] E.R. 201, 218) (Can.).
197
See Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional Definition of
Property? A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 604 (1994).
198
R. v. Stewart, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 963 (Can.).
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here. Rather than rejecting an association with property concepts,
it is desirable to align the content of copyright with the larger law
and theory in regard to legal entitlements. It is easily recognizable
that labels have meaning and doctrines in different areas are
conceptually linked.
Regardless of whether one takes a
traditionally conservative or more expansive, socially-constructed
view of property rights,199 property as a concept and legal
institution is a meaningful one, and conceptual alignment between
these two areas of the larger law of entitlements seems to be a
useful one. The point is not to throw off intellectual property law
for a return to free-ranging common law protections, which may be
the root fear, but to construct meaningful contexts in which to
determine the content of socially desirable entitlements to
resources and things of value.
Indeed, as revealed in the latest judgment of the Supreme Court
of Canada dealing with substantive copyright doctrine and the
troubling regional split in that court, Canadian copyright law is
caught between the tensions generally associated with common
law copyright and civilian droit d’auteur traditions.200 It has been
suggested that at least part of the problem in Theberge is a
reluctance to accept a unique Canadian implementation of a
universal principle; the lost truth being that “copyright is the same
everywhere, the only nuances being provided artificially by legal
tools and techniques, which differ from one State to the next” and
that undue reliance on received common law visions distort the
efficacy of any independent analysis.201 With respect, this is
somewhat simplistic.
Each jurisdiction must be taken
independently and assessed with regard to its own developed
traditions and needs; Canada is sovereign in its own law-making.
However, and flowing from, rather than opposed to, the need for
199

For discussion of socially constructed property rights in valuable intangibles, see
CRAIG ROTHERHAM, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE: RIGHTS, WRONGS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
(Mathew H. Kramer ed., Palgrave, 2001); Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 252 (1991); Arnold S. Weinrib, Information and Property, 36 U.
TORONTO L.J. 117 (1988); Sam Ricketson, ‘Reaping without Sowing’: Unfair
Competition and Intellectual Property Rights in Anglo-Australian Law, U. NEW S.
WALES L.J. 1 (1984).
200
Théberge, 17 S.C.R. at 34.
201
NORMAND TAMARO, THE 2002 ANNOTATED COPYRIGHT ACT, at xii (2002).
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jurisprudential self-determination, this author would dispute the
claim that copyright is (or should be) the same everywhere.
Differing jurisdictions judge the nature and level of personal
entitlement differently in respect to discrete forms of subject
matter, and are informed by differing theoretical perspectives on
the nature of both personal and public entitlement. These
differences can be both substantive and structural. Conceptions
regarding the genus property, informed by public policy
considerations in respect to the species intellectual property,
should not be eliminated completely from the analysis. It is the
conceptual framework in which the analysis should be conducted.
At the same time, not all entitlements need to be full-blown
property rights, and that is a point that this author suggests is
important in database protection. Perhaps it is not a failure to
consider the international or comparative context that is at the root
of the problem, rather than a reluctance to place the difficult
theoretical issues within a conventional doctrinal frame. To be
fair, this author would suggest that Justice Binnie did just that in
Theberge.202
Turning to the issue at hand, perhaps the most controversial
decision in the Canadian copyright law in recent years is that of the
Federal Court of Appeal in Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v.
American Business Information Inc.203 In Tele-Direct, using the
amendments to the 1993 Copyright Act as a point of departure, the
court took the view that Canadian copyright law has been, and
should be, accommodative of creative authorship.204 Hence, and
with an eye towards regional harmonization of laws through
NAFTA, the Canadian law regarding the copyright protection of
factual compilations ought to draw itself in line with the Feist
approach in the United States—authorship, and not mere selfgeneration, should become the focal point of judicial concern.205 It
is a controversial position that has been subject of much scrutiny.
Tele-Direct, occurring after the decision of the Canadian
Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) to
202
203
204
205

Théberge, 17 S.C.R. at 34.
[1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can.).
See id. at 39.
See id.
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regard raw telephone subscriber data as not protectable in
copyright and properly subject to mandatory licensing,206 involved
the question of the copyright protection of a yellow pages
directories published and distributed in both the provinces of
Ontario and Quebec.207 At trial, Justice McGillis held that the
subscriber data were not subject to copyright (and thus were not
independently protected), and that the sub-compilation of these
data was structured according to industry convention such that the
headings created by the publishers to accompany the data were
similarly commonplace (and thus that the originality test was not
met, even on the standard of labor, skill and judgment).208 Even if
there was copyright in the Tele-Direct compilation, there was no
infringement.209
On appeal, the trial judgment was upheld on different
reasoning.210 In the Federal Court of Appeal, and after reviewing
the record below, Décary J.A. turned to the importance of the
changes to the Copyright Act through the NAFTA enabling
legislation,211 which it was held did two things: broadened the
categories of compilations beyond literary works to include
artistic, dramatic and musical works and amended the Act to
reflect article 1705(1)(b) of NAFTA.212
NAFTA, article
1705(1)(b) provides, in the same terms as TRIPS, article 10(2):
“Compilations of data or other material, whether in machine
readable or other form, which by reason of the selection or
arrangement of their contents constitute intellectual creations, shall

206

See Bell Canada—Provision of Telephone Directory Data Base Information in
Machine-Readable Form, Telecom Decision CRTC 90-12 (June 14, 1990); Bell
Canada—Directory File Service, Telecom Decision CRTC 92-1 (March 3, 1992);
Graham A. Knight, The Fall and Rise of Sweat of the Brow, 13 INTELL. PROP. J. 337, 348
(1998–1999).
207
Tele-Direct (Publ’ns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., [1996] 74 C.P.R.3d 72, 74, aff’d,
[1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can. 1997).
208
See id.
209
See id. at 101
210
Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 22.
211
The Canadian Copyright Act was amended to comply with NAFTA, see supra note
52, art. 1705(1)(b), regarding the definition of compilations, through the NAFTA
Implementation Act, see supra note 52, § 53.
212
Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 29.
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be protected as such.”213 The effect of these provisions, it was
held, was a deliberate departure from the prevailing sweat of the
brow approach, towards the adoption of the Feist test.214 Décary
J.A. stated:
Clearly, what the parties to the Agreement wanted to
protect were compilations of data that “embody original
expression within the meaning of [the Berne] Convention”
and that constitute “intellectual creations.” The use of
these last two words is most revealing: compilations of data
are to be measured by standards of intellect and creativity.
As these standards were already present in Anglo-Canadian
jurisprudence—as we shall see later—the author can only
assume that the Canadian government in signing the
Agreement and the Canadian Parliament in adopting the
1993 amendments to the Copyright Act expected the Court
to follow the “creativity” school of cases rather than the
“industrious collection” school.215
After re-iterating that the law has always been that only original
compilations may attract copyright and that the threshold of
originality is a low one, Décary J.A. stated:
It is true that in many of the cases we have been referred to,
the expression “skill, judgment or labour” has been used to
describe the test to be met by a compilation in order to
qualify as original and, therefore, to be worthy of copyright
protection. It seems to me, however, that whenever “or”
was used instead of “and,” it was in a conjunctive rather
than in a disjunctive way. It is doubtful that considerable
labour combined with a negligible degree of skill and
judgment will be sufficient in most situations to make a
compilation of data original. One should always keep in
mind that one of the purposes of the copyright legislation,
213

TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 10(2); NAFTA, supra note 52, art. 1705(1)(b). Both
TRIPS, art. 10(2), and NAFTA, art. 1705(1)(b), provide further that “[s]uch protection,
which shall not extend to the data or material itself, shall be without prejudice to any
copyright subsisting in the data or material itself.” Id.
214
See Tele-Direct, [1998] 2 F.C. at 31–32 para 15.
215
Id. The presumption was rejected by Linden J.A. in CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law
Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385, paras. 40, 55 (Can.).
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historically, has been “to protect and reward the intellectual
effort of the author (for a limited period of time) in the
work” (emphasis added). The use of the word “copyright”
in the English version of the Act has obscured the fact that
what the Act fundamentally seeks to protect is “le droit
d’auteur.” While not defined in the Act, the word “author”
conveys a sense of creativity and ingenuity. The author
does not read these cases which have adopted the “sweat of
the brow” approach in matters of compilations of data as
having asserted that the amount of labour would in itself be
a determinative source of originality. If they did, their
approach was wrong and is irreconcilable with the
standards of intellect and creativity that were expressly set
out in NAFTA and endorsed in the 1993 amendments to the
Copyright Act and that were already recognized in AngloCanadian law.216
Adopting the Feist test, it was held that the test of originality in
respect to compilations of data is properly one of “labor, skill and
judgment,” based on some low threshold of creativity on the part
of the author of the database; the policy concern being to support a
robust conception of authorship in structuring the statutory
entitlement and not to extend that entitlement directly to factual
material.217 Though the standard of creativity was set at a
minimum threshold, this was a significant departure from existing
practice.
A number of points can be made in relation to Tele-Direct.
First, the court adopts an attitude towards American constitutional
and intellectual property law that is itself not very nuanced. It
takes no account of the differing construction of the “ideaexpression dichotomy” in American jurisprudence, of judiciallydeveloped principles such as the merger doctrine, nor of the
systemic hostility to functional expression. To paraphrase Lord
Hailsham, it is true that each of Canada, Britain, and the United
States doesn’t allow copyright to attach to facts, but it all depends

216
217

Id. para. 29.
Id. para. 34.
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what you mean by a “fact.” To remove Feist from its context and
drop it into the Canadian law of copyright is problematic.
Second, and perhaps most important, it is unclear as to what
Décary J.A. intends by labeling Canada as a droit d’auteur system
and emphasizing authorship.218 As Justice Binnie recently held in
the Theberge litigation, the distinction between personal authorcentered interests associated with protection of moral rights and
owner-centered mercantile interests association with copyright is
both a real and profound one in Canadian law.219 Copyright is of
much less exalted status, and is an exploitation-oriented right
bound up with “a conception of artistic and literary works
essentially as articles of commerce.”220 Creative authorship in the
civilian tradition is foreign to such a conception of copyright;
authors and owner-assignees are protected in copyright, but
authorship less so. Given the mercantile orientation of the
copyright, the traditional hostility of common law jurisdictions to
creative authorship is primarily due to the difficulties in leaving
such an open-ended creativity standard to judges in the context of a
system that is predicated on the vindication of narrow economic
interests towards economic goals rather than the fulfillment of
authorship-centered duties. Typical are the recent comments by
Linden J.A. on the point:
Inevitably, judges will be forced to create their own
definitions of creativity, resulting in substantial uncertainty
and further jeopardizing the public benefit that accrues
from the production of new and original works. The fact
that an objective and coherent definition of “creative” is
elusive at best and that “creativity” can sometimes connote
qualities that are not required of an “original” work makes
it preferable to avoid such unpredictable labels when
assessing originality.221
In principle, such a creativity-linked entitlement is neither
undesirable nor impractical, though it may be unsuitable for
218
219
220
221

See CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th at 385.
Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.).
Id. paras. 12, 15, 22.
CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th para. 58.
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inclusion in the system of copyright as presently set out in the
prevailing statute and accumulated jurisprudence.
Third, the position that Décary J.A. has accepted in relation to
NAFTA, raising the bar in relation to the protection of
compilations through a more stringent construction of the
Berne/NAFTA/TRIPS phrase “intellectual creation,” is dubious.222
As an initial point, it is questionable whether the relevant sections
of NAFTA speak to such substantive standards in a purposeful way
at all, rather than merely tying the accepted status quo to regional
trade-based arrangements.223 Indeed, chapter 17 of NAFTA itself
arises from the work of the GATT official who drafted TRIPS, and
found its way into the treaty when the NAFTA negotiators
abandoned their own documents to proceed from the draft TRIPS
agreement once it was complete.224 Second, the proposition that it
was in the mind of the Canadian negotiators (and later legislators)
to adopt the Feist standard in relation to factual compilations
seems artificial, given that the American law was not fully
developed at the time the treaty was negotiated and the matter was
not a specific topic of negotiation. Finally, to argue that NAFTA is
more deferential to Berne than TRIPS would seem to undercut the
principle of TRIPS itself. That such a requirement may be
desirable is one thing, but that it is mandated by international or
regional agreement is a novel and unconvincing assertion.
Indeed, that Tele-Direct should be properly regarded as
fundamentally altering Canadian conceptions of originality seems
untenable after such an impression was recently “corrected” by a
differently constituted panel of the Federal Court of Appeal.225 In
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, the question
of originality at large and in various types of legal materials,
ranging from headnotes to monographs, was given extensive

222

This point was rejected by Linden J.A. See id. para. 27.
Ron J.T. Corbett, Impact of NAFTA and TRIPS on Intellectual Property Rights
Protections in Canada and the United States, 6 NAFTA: LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 591
(2000).
224
Martin D.H. Woodward, TRIPS and NAFTA’s Chapter 17: How Will Trade-Related
Multilateral Agreements Affect International Copyright?, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 269, 274
(1996).
225
CCH Canadian Ltd., 212 D.L.R.4th at 385.
223
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consideration.226 Both Linden J.A., for the majority, and Rothstein
J.A., concurring, explicitly rejected any reading of Tele-Direct as
fundamentally altering Canadian copyright from the general
approach shared with British law or of altering subsistence of
copyright at large.227 All members of the court supported a
traditional view of originality, which requires that the protected
work originate from the author and be produced by more than mere
copious effort expended in slavishly copying another work.228
Creativity, then, does not function as a foundational criterion.
While strictly obiter, the majority held that after Tele-Direct
there was no alteration at all of subsistence requirements, while the
minority held that there might be a change specifically in the area
of factual compilations.229 Thus, Linden J.A. found:
The author acknowledges that it is more difficult to apply
the standard of originality to some types of works, such as
compilations, than to traditional forms of expression, such
as novels, sculptures or plays. The further one gets away
from traditional literary works, the less obvious it becomes
that a work has not been copied. Compilations of data, for
instance, typically do not display an author’s uniquely
identifiable flare, nor “exhibit, on their face, indicia of the
author’s personal style or manner of expression.” (citation
omitted) This makes it difficult to establish whether
compilations are original or are merely copies. In addition,
some compilations may be comprised of elements that are
copied from other works or parts of works in which
copyright may or may not otherwise subsist. Because the
selection and arrangement of the underlying elements, not
226

See id.
See id. paras. 38, 40, 43–46; id. para. 218 (Rothstein, J.A., concurring).
228
See id. para. 31 (approving the dicta of Lord Oliver in Interlego A.G. v. Tyco
Industries Inc., 1989 A.C. 217, 262–63 (Eng. P.C.) (“Skill, labour or judgment merely in
the process of copying cannot confer originality. . . . A well executed tracing is the result
of much labour and skill but remains what it is, a tracing.”) Interlego, however, was not
a compilation case but one involving derivative works in the context of an attempt to
extend patent and design rights which had terminated. In the context of an artistic work,
as was the nature of the work at issue, more than slavish copying was required—
specifically a discernable visual dissimilarity between the original and the copy.).
229
See id. para. 55.
227
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the elements themselves, must be original, a compiler must
demonstrate something more than merely copying those
elements into a new work before the Act will award
copyright protection. However, Anglo-Canadian copyright
law does not require “creativity” to establish that such a
work is not a mere copy.230
Rothstein J.A., concurring, wrote:
I recognize that Tele-Direct . . . may be read to eliminate
the industrious collection approach to originality that has
sometimes been used for compilations. I also recognize
that debate continues over whether industrious collection or
creativity is the better approach for determining the
originality of compilations. (citation omitted) However, I
am mindful of the words of Estey J. in Compo Co. . . . not
to decide copyright cases on broader grounds than
necessary.231
The position that emerges, consistent with other views of TeleDirect, is that a creativity-linked test of originality may be
discredited as matter of general application, but may still have
currency with respect to factual compilations.232 However, the
explicit rejection of a creativity-linked standard by the majority in
CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada as
undesirable in principle,233 and the endorsement of an equally
traditional view of copyright as a narrow economic right which is
teleologically constructed as an incentive to creation rather than
deonotologically constructed as the lynchpin of creative authorship
by the majority of the Supreme Court in Theberge,234 leaves the
law in a most unsatisfying state. Clearly a compilation of fact
230

Id.
Id. para. 219 (citations omitted).
232
See id.; Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, paras. 40–42 (Can.) (holding
that Tele-Direct does not have “a broad effect” in re-aligning Canadian copyright law
with American law and away from British law in respect to creativity. Justice Reed
acknowledges then that there is some effect, but not “a significant departure from the preexisting law.” Presumably the change is only manifested in respect to compilations of
fact.).
233
See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
234
Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161 (Can.).
231
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requires something more than mere labor to be considered an
original “intellectual creation”; what that quality is, however,
remains imprecise. It “will vary in the circumstances.”235
E. Common Problems
Copyright protects compilations in the form of collections of
original works, of facts, and of the two combined; each must be
original for the protection to subsist as a matter of law. The British
law, both before the implementation of the Database Directive and
after its 1998 implementation in domestic law respecting computer
programs, has used, and continues to use a “sweat of the brow”
approach.236 The law is easy to describe but difficult to predict at
the stage of identifying infringement rather than the protection
stage; the nature and extent of the protection is very much
dependent on the circumstances.237 The nature of the work and the
type and extent of “labor, skill or judgment” brought to bear by the
author on his or her creation informs judgments of originality as
well as substantiality of copying to determine whether there has
been an “over-borrowing” from the original compilation.238 This
blurring of subsistence and substantiality reflects the nature of
British copyright as a means to allied, but shifting, goals as befit
the circumstances.
Thus, for example, in protecting an anthology of poetry, the
court might look to the skill of the author in selecting from
amongst the poet’s accumulated works and the sympathetic
ordering of the poems. The anthologist fits the picture of the
romantic author so revered in the popular conception of copyright.
235

CCH Canadian, 212 D.L.R.4th 385 para. 221.
See Univ. of London Press Ltd. v. Universal Tutorial Press Ltd, [1916] 2 Ch. 601,
608 (Eng.); Ladbroke (Football) Ltd. v. William Hill (Football) Ltd., [1964] 1 W.L.R.
273 (Eng.); Walter v. Lane, 1900 A.C. 539 (appeal taken from Eng.).
237
See, e.g., Biotrading & Financing OY v. Biohit Ltd., 1998 F.S.R. 109, 116 (Eng.
Ch.); Autospin (Oil Seals) Ltd. v. Beehive Spinning, 1995 R.P.C. 683 (Eng. Ch.);
Express Newspapers plc. v. News (U.K.) Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 1320 (Eng. Ch.);
Ladbroke (Football) [1964] 1 W.L.R. at 273; G.A. Cramp & Sons Ltd. v. Frank
Smythson Ltd., 1944 A.C. 329, 338 (Eng.); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Univ. Tutorial
Press Ltd., 45 R.P.C. 335 (Eng. Ch. 1928).
238
Cf. Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd., [2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112, para.
96 (Austl.).
236
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In protecting a functional work like a coupon of football wagers,
the court is more circumspect; considering the effort that went into
collecting the data and presenting it accurately and suitable to a
purpose. It protects the former happily, and the latter grudgingly.
Yet it does protect them both. It does so notwithstanding that the
dominant policy considerations are different as befits the differing
nature of the subject matter—the two works and the justification
for protecting each “are poles apart.”239 Copyright’s mixed
justifications give rise to doctrine that covers the shared concerns
of these two rights-holders: to publish the work or withhold
publication, to exploit the work economically in selected markets,
to translate the work, etc. However, it is the functional nature of
the coupon that draws the work away from the creative and to a
concern with competition which shades the protection differently.
Copyright law explicitly recognizes these functional differences
and tries to stay its hand where it regards protection as
inappropriate.
The American law articulates its hostility to interfering with
free markets differently. Various devices, sometimes bordering on
the fictional, are employed to deny protection rather than forestall
a finding of infringement. The American law has done this
through judicial construction of the idea-expression dichotomy in
respect to “copyrightability” and through doctrine that seeks to
safeguard a principled view of authorship. The Feist test
considered the nature of functional subject matter in the form of
factual compilations and decreed a “modicum of creativity” must
be present to achieve copyright’s goals,240 and the Federal Court of
Canada agreed (though a cloud now sits over that agreement).241
Authorship of a factual compilation “conveys a sense of creativity
and ingenuity” according to Décary J.A. in the Tele-Direct case,
which appears as binding on the matter.242 One might take the
view that these tests are as hard to apply in a predictable and
239

William Hill (Football) Ltd. v. Ladbroke (Football) Ltd., 1980 R.P.C. 539, 555 (Eng.
1962).
240
See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
241
See Tele-Direct (Publ’ns) Inc. v. Am. Bus. Info., Inc., [1996] 74 C.P.R.3d 72, 74,
aff’d, [1998] 2 F.C. 22, 38 (Can. 1997).
242
See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385,
paras. 29, 34 (Can.).
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certain manner as sweat of the brow, and may not be as significant
in practice as one might anticipate after reading the judgments in
Feist and Tele-Direct. Consider subject matter as mundane as a
list of used car prices.243 In CCC Information Services, Inc. v.
Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., the issue before the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was whether a
publication titled the Automobile Red Book—Official Used Car
Valuations was protected in copyright.244 The Red Book was
published eight times a year, in different versions for each of three
regions of the United States plus a single state, and set out values
for each automobile make, model number, body style, and engine
type that were included in the compilation.245 Circuit Judge Leval
found that the compilation was an original compilation under the
Feist test: the prices were not historical statistics but “predictions”
and thus were protectable expression rather than uncopyrightable
facts.246 That these predictions were laid out in the most logical
ordering was insufficient to hold that the expression had merged
with the idea or that the presentation of the material was not
original:
The fact that an arrangement of data responds logically to
the needs of the market for which the compilation was
prepared does not negate originality. To the contrary, the
use of logic to solve the problems of how best to present
the information being compiled is independent creation.247
Moreover, this was what Feist had in mind, according to Judge
Leval:
The thrust of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Feist was not to
erect a high barrier of originality requirement. It was rather
to specify, rejecting the strain of lower court rulings that
243

See CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Mkt. Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d
Cir. 1994); Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135, 141 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that maps satisfy Feist requirements for creativity in selection, coordination, and
arrangement of information); Marshal & Swift v. BS & A Software, 871 F. Supp. 952,
960–61 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding that assessors’ tables satisfy the Feist requirements).
244
See CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 64–74.
245
See id. at 63.
246
See id. at 67.
247
Id. at 67.
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sought to base protection on the “sweat of the brow,” that
some originality is essential to protection of authorship, and
that the protection afforded extends only to those original
elements. Because the protection is so limited, there is no
reason under the policies of the copyright law to demand a
high degree of originality.248
Similarly, in Edutile Inc. v. Automobile Protection Ass’n,249 the
Federal Court of Appeal considered whether guides to the process
of used cars and trucks were original compilations under TeleDirect. These guides were published for consumers rather than car
dealers, as was the case in CCC Information Services.250 The
guides listed three values for each vehicle in side-by-side columns:
trade-in, private sale, and retail values.251 It was this arrangement
that made the compilation not only original, but “brilliant” and
“innovative.”252 Décary J.A. reviewed some of the testimony at
trial and found:
I conclude from this testimony that the fact of setting out
the “Private Sale” market and the “Retail Value” market
side by side in columns was a “brilliant”, “innovative”
move. The Trial Judge could not ignore this decisive
testimony . . . . It is not easy in compilation situations to
draw a line between what signifies a minimal degree of
skill, judgment and labour and what indicates no creative
element . . . . A guide organized in this way is, to use this
Court’s words in Tele-Direct, at paragraph 28 [page 36], “a
work that was independently created by the author and
which displays at least a minimal degree of skill, judgment
and labour in its overall selection or arrangement . . . .”
Copyright accordingly subsists, resulting not from the
three-column layout nor from the selection or designation
as such of the three markets used by the appellant, but from
the selection and layout of two juxtaposed columns, one
248

Id. at 66.
6 C.P.R. (4th) 211 (F.C.), appeal denied, [2001] 1 FC at i (Can.).
250
See CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385,
paras. 29, 34 (Can.); CCC Info. Servs., 44 F.3d at 67.
251
See Edutile, 6 C.P.R.4th para. 3.
252
See id. para. 12.
249
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dealing with the “Private Sale” market and the other
dealing with the “Retail Value” market.253
Though this author anticipates that the language used would be less
effusive, it is beyond doubt that a British court would also extend
protection to each of these price guides, as would a pre-Tele-Direct
Canadian court using a comparable standard, or an Australian court
using a standard of “substantial” labor or expense incurred in the
collection and presentation of data.254 Indeed, though couched in
the language of creativity, the Edutile court itself looked to the
traditional test of labor, skill or judgment, and appears merely to
have expanded the traditional list to include creativity as a relevant
element.255
With respect, the reasoning in each of Edutile and CCC
Information Services seems quite artificial and not directed to
preserving the creativity and ingenuity inherent in any view of
creative authorship; the judgments do make good commercial
sense in protecting the investment of labor that went into the
obtaining, selection, verification, and to some smaller degree, the
arrangement of the data. However, the judgments obscure the
policy reasons justifying protection, construct doctrine in a manner
that does not anticipate the need to address the same concerns
where the data might be presented in digital form, and act in a
traditional manner reflective of the pre-Feist jurisprudence while
attempting to employ some augmented Feist standard.256 The
result is that the Edutile and CCC Information Services may
provide a pragmatic commercial balance through the construction
and application of the originality standard in respect to factual
compilations to a limited extent, but over-looked is the economic
interest in continuing verification and maintenance of the contents
of the database.257 The incentive created through the copyright is

253

Id. paras. 13–15.
Telstra Corp. Ltd. v. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Pty Ltd., [2002] F.C.A.F.C. 112, para. 96
(Austl.).
255
Edutile, 6 C.P.R.4th para. 8.
256
Id.
257
Id.
254
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focused on initial creation of the work, and does not address the
equally significant issue of ongoing maintenance.258
Beyond the uncertainty of subsistence, the treatment of such
factual compilations is on par with any other literary work such
that concerns respecting access to data (and the problem of overlystrong proprietary protections curtailing access) and data
aggregation are left to the general defenses or competition
authorities. Arguably, the American system is best placed to
overcome these problems given the flexibility of the fair use
defense, but the uncertain application of that doctrine does not
really address the concerns raised here in any meaningful way.259
Hence, the problem in all three jurisdictions examined is
uncertainty and unpredictability in respect to developed doctrine.
It is not that the doctrine yields the wrong results; the problem is
more in respect to the difficulty in applying these tests to factual
compilations, and particularly to routinely assembled and verified
collections of data in electronic form. As a result, where formal
legal models of protection display uncertainty, informal models
become important—contract and technological measures—though
these may result in over-containment as much as more formal
models.260 It may be that the tensions that arise in the law based
on the functional nature of the subject matter are not capable of a
final resolution in constructing copyright doctrine; the balance of
interests needs continuous monitoring and occasional rebalancing
in respect to new types of works, new uses, and new markets. This
is of course in addition to concerns that copyright doctrine be
structured to further a principled model of authorship in
constructing an entitlement that is economically, philosophically,
and culturally justifiable.261
Perhaps another approach altogether is warranted.
258

Id.
See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition on the Internet: In
Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 561, 567–80, 622–27
(2001).
260
Id.
261
See generally Robert H. Rothstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and
the Fiction of the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725 (1993) (describing the philosophical
traditions behind the concept of authorship).
259
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III. THE EU DATABASE DIRECTIVE: A TWO-TIERED APPROACH
The Database Directive now forms part of the copyright and
neighboring rights regime established thus far by the European
Union in five Directives presently in force,262 and two awaiting
implementation.263 Prior to the adoption of the Directive, differing
approaches were taken to the core originality criterion for the
protection of factual compilations amongst the various Member
States of the European Union.264 The United Kingdom, Ireland,
the Netherlands, France, Portugal, and Spain all afforded full
protection to collections of facts in one form or another.265
Germany and Italy required the collection to be a “personal
Denmark used the Scandinavian
intellectual creation.”266
catalogue right, which was to be a model for the database right,
providing for a term of ten years’ protection.267 Only Belgium and
Luxembourg limited protection in any real sense.268 All of this
was alongside the differing scope of unfair competition
protections.269 The negotiators of the Database Directive were
tasked with a uniform approach that would afford better and more
effective protection of databases.270

262

Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3; Council Directive 91/250/EEC, 1991 O.J.
(L 122) 42 (legal protection of computer programs); Council Directive 92/100/EEC, 1992
O.J. (L 346) 61 (rental right and lending right and on certain rights related to copyright in
the field of intellectual property); Council Directive 93/83/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 248) 15
(coordination of certain rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright
applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission); Council Directive
93/98/EEC, 1993 (L 290) 9 (harmonization the term of protection of copyright and
certain related rights).
263
Council Directive 2001/84/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 272) 32 (resale right for the benefit of
the author of an original work of art); Council Directive 2001/29/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 167)
10 (harmonization of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information
society).
264
See generally Shireen Smith, Legal Protection of Factual Compilations and
Databases in England—How Will the Database Directive Change the Law in This Area?,
1997 INTELL. PROP. Q. 450, 467.
265
Id. at 451.
266
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id. at 466–67.
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In any regime, new or old, assumptions are made and
uncertainties arise and it is not this author’s intention to dissect the
provisions of the Directive in detail. The problems in the Database
Directive are more profound and can be revealed without a highly
technical analysis. In general, one can conclude that the Directive
casts a net that is too broad, too unchecked by institutional
balancing mechanisms, and too uncertain in many of its provisions
to be a model for others. Some of these uncertainties and flaws
may yet be eliminated when a database jurisprudence emerges
from the European Court of Justice. However, given the tendency
for Member States to implement the Directive with what some
might term a particular European efficiency, there has not been an
abundance of case law yet, and the situation may remain fluid for
some time. One might note that some observers think the situation
is so dire that the Directive ought to be repealed in its entirety as
soon as possible.271 This author thinks that this is a rather drastic
solution to a set of discrete problems, each of which may be cured
or minimized through less radical means.
A. The Goals Of The Directive
Released as part of an ongoing exercise to reform the copyright
laws of the European Union, the 1988 Green Paper on Copyright
and the Challenge of Technology identified database protection as
an area that should be addressed in the reform agenda,272 and by
1991 the Commission felt that reform should be undertaken
without delay.273 The first proposal for a directive was submitted
on April, 15 1992.274 By this time, Feist had been decided as had
some European decisions strongly preferring a creativity-linked
approach to the protection of factual compilations.275 The
271

See Maurer et al., Europe’s Database Experiment, supra note 32, at 790.
See Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues
Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final at 207 [hereinafter Green Paper].
273
See Follow-up to the Green Paper, COM(90)584 final.
274
See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1992 O.J. (C 156) 4.
275
See P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Implementing the European Database Directive, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HERMAN
COHEN JEHORAM 184, 195–96, 199–200 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom eds.,
1998). See, e.g., Van Dale Lexicografie B.V. v. Rudolf Jan Romme (holding that the
272
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Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the proposal took
account of the developments in the United States, as well as the
WIPO and GATT/TRIPS negotiations, and stated a preference for
some degree of protection that would arise on the basis of effort
rather than creativity.276 Thus, protection of databases would not
be limited in principle by that which might arise under a rigid
regime oriented to protecting creativity-linked conceptions of
authorship.277 The point was to construct a protection for
databases that would be tied to their functional, rather than
aesthetic nature, obviating the need for an artificially weak
construction of creativity.278 Thus, from its earliest stages, the
Directive was envisaged as one that should relate to the nature of
the subject matter and the economic interest in protection, but the
form of the protection was still firmly tied to a proprietary
approach.279
By 1993, in the Amended Proposal280 released after the process
of initial consultation and revision, there was interest in a
supplementary sui generis database right to copyright protection—
a right that would be a non-proprietary and that could be modeled
on the 10-year catalogue right in the Scandinavian countries.281
The Amended Proposal was amended and re-amended as it made
its way through the various institutions in the European legislative
process, and became the final version of the Database Directive
when adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers in 1996.282 As agreed in final form, the Directive creates

creativity test—“the author’s personal view”—had been met in organizing a dictionary of
the Dutch language), aff’d, 1994 Nederlandse Jurisprudentie [NJ] 58 (Ct. App.).
276
Explanatory Memorandum, COM(92)24 final at 36–38, paras. 6.1–.2.1.
277
Id. at 25.
278
Id.
279
Id. at 26–31.
280
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Databases,
1993 O.J. (C 308) 1 [hereinafter Amended Proposal].
281
Gunnar W.G. Karnell, The Nordic Catalogue Rule, in PROTECTING WORKS OF FACT
67 (Egbert J. Dommering & P. Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 1991) (pointing out that the
copyright acts of all five Nordic countries—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and
Sweden—contain provisions expressly protecting non-original compilations of data, such
as catalogues, tables and similar compilations, provided they comprise “a large number”
of items).
282
Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3.
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a two-tiered approach to database protection: copyright protection
on the basis of a creativity-linked test of originality with a term of
the life of the author plus seventy years, and, the new sui generis
database right with a term of fifteen years.283 Made explicit in the
negotiations and final form of the Directive was the restriction that
data is not to be the subject of independent protection in providing
protection to the database in which it is arranged and presented.284
B. Copyright Under the Directive
Under the terms of the Directive, copyright protection only
subsists in those databases which “by reason of the selection or
arrangement of their contents, constitute the author’s own
intellectual creation.”285 No other criteria are to be applied to
determine their eligibility for that protection,286 and the test will
not admit of aesthetic or qualitative criteria.287
Professor
Hugenholtz describes the final version of the originality test as
reflective of the tortuous state of the negotiations: “[i]t is a typical
European compromise, higher than the British requirement of ‘skill
and labour’, but lower than the test of ‘Überdurchschnittlichkeit’
[clear originality].”288
In the EU, Member States with droit d’auteur systems typically
use variations on a creativity standard that is equal to, and
sometimes higher than, the Feist test.289 In such droit d’auteur
systems, originality goes far beyond constructing a higher
threshold of protection as a gate-keeping device to limit the
protection of utilitarian subject-matter; it speaks to a different
philosophical approach to the issues which is predicated on the
protection of the personality of the author as captured in his or her
283

See id. art. 10; Council Directive 93/98/EEC, supra note 262, art. 1.
Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 45.
285
Id. art. 3.
286
Id. art. 3(1).
287
See id. para. 16.
288
Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 187. See Inkassoprogramm, Bundesgeritchtshofes in
Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Supreme Court] 94, 276 (285) (F.R.G.); GUY TRITTON,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN EUROPE 213 (1996).
289
See Neeta Thakur, Database Protection in the European Union and the United
States: The European Database Directive as an Optimum Global Model?, 2001 INTELL.
PROP. Q. 100, 109.
284
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creation.290 In any case, implementation of this aspect of the
Directive in such civilian jurisdictions is relatively straightforward;
their existing approaches to originality are already compliant, save
where exceptional protections exist.291
There have been
suggestions that those standards are too high and will have to be
revised downwards to ensure compliance, but that has not yet been
addressed in implementing legislation or in jurisprudence.292
For the United Kingdom, Ireland and the Netherlands, more
serious attention to compliance has been required. 293 While the
term “intellectual creation” is based on the Berne Convention
standard,294 and the term “the author’s own intellectual creation” is
the same as that used in the Software Directive,295 the position
adopted by the United Kingdom is that what is intended in the
Database Directive is a higher test of originality with application
only to databases.296 This would mean that United Kingdom
copyright law (aside from databases) would still be regarded as
generally compliant with the Berne Convention’s use of the same
standard, which itself has not seriously been doubted in the past.
This position is bolstered by the Explanatory Memorandum, which
explains that the originality test should not be the same for

290

Id.; see also Gary Lea, In Deference of Originality, 7 ENT. L. REV. 21 (1996)
(discussing that some see the differences as exaggerated, specifically in respect to
functional matter).
291
But see Thakur, supra note 289, at 113.
292
See Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 187 (“According to Gaster, the Commission
official who was directly involved with the drafting of the Directive, all continental
European Member States would have to lower the existing requirement of originality in
respect to databases: ‘Politically speaking the common law Member States will have to
lift the bar for application of copyright protection, whereas the continental civil law
countries will have to lower it. This bridging the gap between copyright and droit
d’auteur is certainly not de minimis.’” (quoting Jens L. Gaster, The EU Council of
Ministers’ Common Position Concerning the Legal Protection of Databases: A First
Comment, 17 ENT. L. REV. 258, 260 (1995)).
293
The Netherlands has been unique in allowing a “pseudo-copyright” to attach to non–
original expression. See Tobias Cohen Jehoram, Copyright in Non-Original Writings:
Past—Present—Future?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF HERMAN COHEN JEHORAM 103, 105 (Jan J.C. Kabel & Gerard J.H.M. Mom
eds., 1998).
294
See Berne, supra note 62, art. 2(1).
295
Council Directive 91/250/EEC, supra note 262, art. 1(3).
296
See SHERMAN & BENTLY, supra note 80, at 95 n.81.
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databases as for literary works in general.297 Moreover, it seems
perfectly sensible and consistent with the general assumption in the
negotiations that the two-tiered approach adopted by the EU would
be one that retains copyright in compliance with international
obligations and national laws, but relegates it to a smaller role in
the revised regime. In any case, the lack of objection from the
Commission to the use of the higher standard elsewhere in the
United Kingdom copyright regime and specifically in respect to
computer programs seems to indicate its acquiescence to the
British approach.
Thus, it would seem that Directive has been successful in
cutting down the broad application of copyright based on a more
refined model of authorship, consistent with the approaches
favored in civilian jurisdiction, the United States, and Canada.
C. The Database Right
The database right is the core and most important aspect of the
Database Directive.298 It is a non-proprietary protection that is
independent of any copyright or other intellectual property right
that may exist in the database, or in any of the individual pieces of
data or information collected together within the database.299
Article 7(1) of the Directive provides:
Member States shall provide for a right for the maker of a
database which shows that there has been qualitatively
and/or quantitatively a substantial investment in either the
obtaining, verification or presentation of the contents to
prevent extraction and/or re-utilization of the whole or of a
substantial
part,
evaluated
qualitatively
and/or
quantitatively, of the contents of that database.300
The database right evolved significantly during the legislative
process.301 The initial interest in protecting such subject-matter
was the recognition that existing protections were inadequate given
297
298
299
300
301

See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, paras. 3.2.5–.6.
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 7.
See id. art. 7(4).
Id. art. 7(1).
See Hugenholtz, supra note 275, at 185.
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the ease by which digital databases could be copied—the
traditional concern that the subject-matter at issue was expensive
to compile and maintain, but was easy to misappropriate.302 This
naturally led to a rationale for protection predicated upon the same
range of unfair competition principles that are present in common
law copyright approaches.303 In this sense, the initial orientation of
the Directive fit both the immediate copyright reform agenda, and,
the on-again, off-again interest in harmonizing unfair competition
protections.304
There are three main problems with the database right: the
absence of a strong link between the provisions as expressed and
the justification for the protection, the protections as expressed are
themselves overly-broad, and, there is uncertainty as to the level of
investment required to attract or maintain database right. In the
first proposal for the Database Directive, the right of the maker of
the database was against unfair extraction and/or utilization, in
commercial circumstances.305 This was changed on the reasoning
that fairness of extraction or utilization was a more difficult matter
to judge than unauthorized extraction or reutilization.306 Yet even
the word “unauthorized” was eliminated from the later Amended
Proposal while the infringing acts retained as then drafted.307 The
302

See Green Paper, supra note 272, paras. 6.4.7–.10, .6.2.
See Xuqiong (Joanna) Wu, Foreign and International Law: Database Protection
E.C. Database Directive, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 571, 575 (2002).
304
See generally Frauke Henning-Bodewig & Gerhard Schricker, New Initiatives For
The Harmonisation Of Unfair Competition Law In Europe 24 EUROPEAN INTELL. PROP.
REV. 271 (2002); Gerhard Schricker, Twenty Five Years of Protection Against Unfair
Competition, INT’L REV. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [IIC] 782 (1995) (providing an
update on statute of efforts to harmonize unfair competition law); Friedrick-Karl Beier,
The Law of Unfair Competition in the European Community, Its Development and
Present Status, 16 IIC 139 (1985) (discussing historic development of unfair competition
law in Europe); Eugen Ulmer, Unfair Competition Law in the European Economic
Community, 4 IIC 188 (1973) (discussing harmonization of unfair competition laws).
305
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, art. 2(5) (“Member States shall provide
for a right for the maker of a database to prevent the unauthorized extraction or
reutilization, from that database, of its contents, in whole or in substantial part, for
commercial purposes.”).
306
Debra B. Rosler, The European Union’s Proposed Directive for the Legal Protection
of Databases: A New Threat to the Free Flow of Information, 10 HIGH TECH. L.J. 105,
115–16 (1995).
307
Compare Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 276, art. 2(5), with Amended
Proposal, supra note 280, at 10(1), and Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art.
303
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unfortunate result is that while the Directive is concerned with
misappropriation of the investment in the creation and maintenance
of databases, the Directive lacks a unifying principle to guide
doctrinal development of “extraction” and “re-utilization” within
its text. This seems particularly unfortunate as the break in the link
between protection and justification denudes the Directive of the
conceptual certainty that plagues the problematic application of
differing models of copyright law to functional subject matter.
Indeed, this move away from a directed protection against
misappropriation of investment by rivals and commercial actors to
a protection of investment308 generally is a central weakness.
The protections themselves become susceptible to overly broad
application absent a limiting principle. For example, extraction as
a singular basis for infringement leads to some surprising results—
a hacker who accesses a database without a license, looks at the
data, and memorizes it may well be guilty of extraction according
to one judge,309 as well as a “deep-linker” who seeks to aggregate
information from disparate sources.310 These seem outside the
justification for the right and intellectual property protections
generally. Similarly, re-utilization alone would seem to cover a
myriad of uses in respect to the Internet. The provisions in the
Directive lack specificity in these contexts, and one might expect
that the Directive will have to be interpreted narrowly to avoid
these implications.
Similarly, little guidance is given as to what constitutes a
“substantial part” 311 of the database for the purposes of judging
infringement. This adds little to remedying the problem of
differential national application of copyright norms, where a
purposive approach renders the question intimately involved with
questions of originality. Clearly, it is the database that is protected
rather than the data, so that one might expect that the same sort of
7(1). Yet Recital 6 of the Directive still lists as justification the absence of a generalized
law of unfair competition “to prevent the unauthorized extraction and/or re-utilization of
the contents of a database.” Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 6.
308
Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, para. 42.
309
British Horseracing Bd. Ltd. v. William Hill Org. Ltd, 2001 R.P.C. 31, para. 57.,
rev’d in part, 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268 (Eng.).
310
See Hugenholtz, supra note 275.
311
Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 7(2).
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trap that the Australian High Court fell into respecting the value of
every individual item in a computer program will not be
repeated.312 This was the position accepted by Justice Laddie in
the recent William Hill case in the United Kingdom, presently
before the European Court of Justice.313
However, what
“database-ness” consists of seems elusive at present, which is
troubling given the breadth of the protections created by the
Directive.
D. Defenses and Permissions
The problems associated with a wide-ranging database right are
compounded by the inadequate range of defenses and exceptions
included within the provisions of the Directive.314 This is most
unfortunate given the early recognition in the negotiating process
that protections recognized ought to be balanced against suitable
312

Autodesk Inc. v. Dyason, [1992] R.P.C. 575 (Austl.); contra Howard P. Knopf, The
Database Dilemma in Canada: Is “Ultra” Copyright Required?, 48 U. NEW BRUNSWICK
L.J. 163, 172 (1999) (regarding the draft WIPO Database Treaty).
313
See William Hill, 2001 R.P.C. para. 47. In the William Hill case, BHB (the
governing body for British horseracing) developed and maintained a large database of
horses, owners, racing colors, trainers, jockeys and other information (most if not all
available in the public domain). William Hill, in facts reminiscent of Int’l News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), obtained data from a subscriber to BHB’s
database and used it to operate its Internet gambling service. The data obtained was
presented in a new format (with only the details of the meeting, race, list of horses
running, and time of the race being re-utilized) but was not a substantial quantity of all
the data available in BHB’s database. It was held that this breached database right.
Justice Laddie canvassed the Database Directive and its U.K. implementation and held
that facts fell within the contemplation of the drafters in creating the new sui generis
right. On appeal, 2001 E.W.C.A. Civ. 1268, the argument made was that Justice Laddie
had interpreted the Directive over broadly and that there was a mix of inconsistent
European authority. While inclined to dismiss the appeal, the Court of Appeal referred
the matter to the ECJ:
whether infringement of database right requires that there be a copying of the
systematic arrangement of data as presented in the original database; whether
extraction or re-utilization must be from the original directly, and whether
obtaining from a licensee is outside the scope of the protection; and whether a
“dynamic database” is a series of databases with separate rights, rather than one
database whose contents are protected on different terms.
Id.
314
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, art. 12 (providing that “Member States
shall provide appropriate remedies in respect to infringements of the rights provided for
in this Directive.”).
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permissions to enable appropriate access to data. Though there is
scope for national action by Member States,315 the sole mandatory
general user permission is a narrow one.316 Article 8(1) provides:
The maker of a database which is made available to the
public in whatever manner may not prevent a lawful user of
the database from extracting and/or re-utilizing
insubstantial parts of its contents, evaluated qualitatively
and/or quantitatively, for any purposes whatsoever. Where
the lawful user is authorized to extract and/or re-utilize
only part of the database, this paragraph shall apply only to
that part.317
The provision goes on, in article 8(2), to disallow the lawful user
performing acts “which conflict with normal exploitation of the
database or unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
maker of the database.”318 These limiting provisions bear
resemblance to the Berne, article 9(2), which allows for national
defenses “provided that such reproduction does not conflict with
the normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of another.”319 Article 9(1) was
added to the Berne in the Stockholm Revision (1967) to ensure that
the right of reproduction would be a minimum protection in all
Berne Union countries, notwithstanding that its existence under
Berne had been assumed.320 Article 9(2) limits the right so as to
allow countries to create exceptions, and should be construed
narrowly so as not to interfere with the normal rights of
exploitation associated with the copyright work.321 The provisions
were drafted by a special working party that was struck to address
concerns respecting reprography (private copying in large
numbers) and home taping of sound recordings and films broadcast

315

See id. art. 12 (preserving defenses existing in law in respect to copyright); id. art. 9
(allowing Member States to create exceptions for private use, teaching or scientific
research, and public security or an administrative or judicial procedure).
316
See id. art. 8(1).
317
Id.
318
Id. art. 8(2).
319
Berne, supra note 62, art. 9(2); see also TRIPS, supra note 76, art. 13.
320
See RICKETSON, supra note 66, at 120.
321
See Berne, supra note 62, art. 9(2); NORDEMANN ET AL., supra note 66, at 107–08.
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on television.322 The Report of the Stockholm Conference makes
clear that national jurisdictions can create exceptions for special
circumstances such as private use and for teaching and research,
but that the reproduction right must be respected in respect to its
normal exploitation. 323
This paucity of meaningful and compulsory defenses becomes
more serious given the lack of mandatory licensing provisions
within the Directive itself in respect to single-source data. The
Directive contemplates that the refusal to license at all or on fair
terms will allow for intervention,324 as was the case in Magill,
where the Commission was able to prevent the secondary market
in television listings from being dominated unfairly by the data
provider on the assumption that copyright existed in the program
listings.325 However, whether the failure to exercise the right to
license the data according to the sui generis database right is the
“exercise of an intellectual property right”326 is uncertain, and,
more seriously, it may be possible for the database holder to mount
the defense that as the right doesn’t attach to data and the data is
presumably available elsewhere in an unprocessed or unpublished
form, there is no scope for dominance according to Magill.327
The result is that the broad scope of the right is not balanced
against meaningful defenses or permissions, and that the wide
allowance for the development of defenses within particular
jurisdictions undercuts the goal of harmonized treatment. The
further result is that the sui generis database right has emerged as
property-like protection without the institutional devices available
in other intellectual property areas to provide market or public
interest-based balance. In this way, the desire to provide an
adequate level of protection while avoiding the prospect of overcontainment through a proprietary model has led to just that—a
wide right without adequate balancing mechanisms.
322

See NORDEMANN ET AL., supra note 66, at 33.
Report of the Rapporteur Général (Svante Bergström), para. 85, translated in
STEPHEN M. STEWART & HAMISH SANDISON, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 122 (1989).
324
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, at para. 47.
325
Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., [1995] 4 C.M.L.R. 18.
326
See Council Directive 96/9/EC, supra note 3, paras. 17, 18.
327
See id.
323
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CONCLUSIONS: THE WAY FORWARD IN REFORM
The legal issues raised in respect to the protection of factual
compilations are not new, but the business and legal environment
is different today than in the past and may favor substantially
revised legal models as a consequence. That environment is no
longer a strictly national one, and, looking to the copyright revision
exercise, it should be borne in mind that the best solutions are
those that further the international interest in harmonization of
laws. For the law of copyright, this means that functional
expression should be treated for the utilitarian subject matter that it
is, with less emphasis on the protection of artificial authorial
creativity and with more emphasis on the protection of investment
against misappropriation. The reality is that Canadian law does
protect factual compilations at present, where the originality test
can be satisfied to allow copyright to subsist in such material.328
Like the United States and the United Kingdom, it does so
hesitantly, with difficulty, and through uncertain doctrine prone to
misapplication.329 The result is that legal protection is unclear (and
thus the costs of determining and enforcing rights increase, with
those costs passed to users), with the likely result that informal
protections (contract, the use of technology) are employed by
rational business people seeking to safeguard their investment.
These informal models of protection should be of as much concern
to those weighing the balance between protection and access
interests as formalized proprietary models.
Moreover, this
approach fails to address the public interest concerns associated
with specific uses of data (leaving them for the general defenses
that are made available in respect to all original literary works),
fails to address the economics of databases meaningfully
(specifically the interest in promoting an optimal degree of
maintenance), and leaves the problem of data aggregation for
competition authorities (not intrinsically bad, but a complication
that could be resolved better internally).

328

See Galerie d'art du Petit Champlain Inc. v. Théberge, [2002] 17 C.P.R.4th 161
(Can.); CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, [2002] 212 D.L.R.4th 385,
paras. 29, 34 (Can.); Hager v. ECW Press Ltd., [1999] 2 F.C. 287, paras. 40–42 (Can.).
329
See supra Parts III.B–C.
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Looking across jurisdictions and concluding that these
problems are common to them, it is also apparent that copyright
law seeks to protect factual compilations on a blending of various
justifications but primarily on the basis of a generalized concept of
unfair competition. Protecting such an interest traditionally poses
problems for the law, and protection of a variety of forms of
intellectual property through a direct tort on that basis has been
avoided in the past on principle. Simply put, the cure of a roving
tort not subject to internal balancing mechanisms in respect to
valuable intangibles is felt to be worse than the disease of
misappropriation of investment by trade rivals. Thus copyright has
sufficed in protection of factual compilations, but uneasily.
If copyright is to continue in this area, as it must pending
revision of international agreements at the very least, perhaps it is
not wrong that it does so on the basis of the protection of a
principled model of authorship. This leads to the desirable
consequence of leaving purely utilitarian collections completely
outside proprietary regimes and including only the very few
collections that can meet a stricter test within the copyright system.
Thus, the anthologist who meets a higher creativity-linked test is
truly an author deserving of not only the right to exploit his or her
work, but also of those non-economic moral rights which
accompany copyright protection. The corporate maker of a
database that is continuously updated through the use of automated
technology is not regarded as being similarly situated.
Less-worthy (“unoriginal”) databases are still worthy of some
form of protection; protection that will provide an economic
incentive to create and make widely available the comprehensive
and verifiably accurate sets of pure data that are so important
today. Thus, it may be that a two-tiered approach is most
appropriate—copyright protection based on a higher standard, and,
a new sui generis right to protect factual compilations (whether in
digital or conventional form) that is directed at the protection of
the substantial investment made in the selection, arrangement,
presentation, or verification of the contents of the database. This
answers the need unmet by copyright at present, the provision of
an incentive to maintain the database on an ongoing basis.
Provided that the term of the right and the test for subsistence are
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set appropriately, such a database right would be a positive
contribution to the copyright reform exercise. Indeed, such a
revised two-tiered regime may not only be a suitable way forward
for Canada, but a revised Canadian regime along these lines would
also be useful in setting the agenda for a second attempt at a
database treaty under the auspices of WIPO.
The European experience in this regard is instructive.330 What
began as a directed vehicle for database protection that balanced
competing interests became an unfocussed and asymmetric
regime.331 It is a good idea gone wrong. What is required in a
revised Canadian model is far greater certainty in specifying the
justification for protection, the level of investment required to
attract and maintain protection, and the term of the right. These
are primarily economic matters and the empirical studies by
leading international economists should be of great help in
constructing a better system along the same broad lines as created
in the Database Directive. Rather than obscured and artificial
reasoning tied to either authorial creativity alone or as an element
of a general test of “labor, skill or judgment,” revised models
should feature transparent economic criteria capable of more
certain application. At the same time, it would be very useful to
include provisions within the statutory framework to deal with the
problem of data aggregation directly, rather than leaving the matter
to competition law at large. This is also an area in which studies
respecting the economics of databases would be of great
assistance. This author wishes to detail the optimal term of
protection and the level of investment required, but doing so would
make heroic assumptions about the ability of legal academics to
draw accurate economic conclusions.
Moreover, this author suggests that it is important to recognize
that lawyers and judges are not economists, and neither is the
singular goal of intellectual property law to create an optimally
efficient market in intellectual property. As economic efficiency is
to economists, so too is the “rule of law” to lawyers—an imprecise
ideal that gathers together concepts of equality, fairness, human
330
331

See supra Part IV.
See id.
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rights, and principled regulation. Thus, a meaningful mechanism
for balancing competing interests is crucial. Ultimately, the
question of public interest uses is a matter of policy rather than law
and resolution is bound up with prevailing conceptions of legal
culture. Thus, whether a given system prefers these decisions to be
made by trial courts under the auspices of a quasi-equitable fair use
defense (with the implicit requirement that litigation, if not
encouraged, is at least not discouraged through the costs rules)332
or by the legislature which takes upon itself the task of enacting
narrow provisions as required from time to time (as has been more
of the tradition in Canada and the United Kingdom), it matters less
for the narrow purposes of intellectual property protection what
method is chosen but that the process establishes itself as a
meaningful vehicle to weigh competing interests and re-balance
the scale to accommodate changing new or changing
circumstances. Thus, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to
create a series of public-interest based permissions in the abstract
and much more desirable to leave such matters where they belong,
with Parliament. With regret to those favoring complete models,
no more specific proposition is possible given it is the use of the
subject matter that is at issue, not its character.

332

See supra note 139 and accompanying text.

